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A Shortage of Strategists

Gerald P. Stadler

Today, we are short of military strategists. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was a strategist. Ike valued history and developed an understanding of military strategy anchored on that foundation. One of the most important developments that emerged within the Army's officer corps of the 1920s and 1930s was the study habit, although only a few officers acquired it. This habit was not merely a study of war or battles or past leaders—it encompassed those, of course, but also much more. It included an understanding that history is a bridge toward a grasp of strategy.

General Eisenhower in his book, *At Ease*, recalls a particular Sunday afternoon at Fort Meade in 1920 when, after dinner, he and George S. Patton were questioned closely by an officer who was interested in their views on tanks. The subject was not well developed in the minds of officers in the U.S. Army at that time. In England, Basil H. Liddell Hart and John F.C. Fuller had been thoroughly critical of the unimaginative use of tanks during the First World War. Patton had led tanks in that conflict and headed the tank school at Langres, France. But the U.S. Army was slow to encourage or even allow the concepts of armored warfare to develop. Broader strategic analysis likewise languished. In fact, it is probably charitable to say that the Army of the 1930s did not encourage intellectual curiosity as a vital dimension of officer development. Fortunately for Ike, a master was about to take on the challenge of stirring Ike's intellectual curiosity.

The man who turned Ike around was Fox Conner. During a three-year tour with Conner's brigade in Panama, Ike began to study history. More importantly, he came to understand its relationship to strategic thinking. The assignment to Panama was a fortunate follow on to that Sunday afternoon when Conner listened to Eisenhower's and Patton's views about tank warfare. Fox Conner's personal library contained the books that led Ike to study the American Civil War, as well as the wars of Europe and Asia. Conner saw to it that Ike was exposed to a broad spectrum of strategic thought in which to integrate his study of history, and he used their

regular horseback rides on tactical reconnaissances to find out what his student had learned. Ike's experience was not typical. More commonly, officers before World War II neglected the study of military history and strategy—and their relationship one to another.

The 1920s and 1930s are not a bright or inspiring part of the Army's history. We know many of the grim tales from those two decades, as severe reductions in the size of the Army occurred despite repeated warnings by successive commanding generals that military strength had dropped below the danger level. Pay was reduced, more than once. During one month, there was no pay at all. The force was equipped with old weapons, and training was neglected. The Army withdrew inside its forts, entertained itself, talked to itself, and became increasingly isolated from the surrounding communities. Inadequate pay and operational funds, as much as any factor, contributed to the Army's sense of isolation and malaise.

The Army of the interwar years also seemed numb mentally. Yet a remarkable contradiction of those decades is that, despite the prevailing climate, there arose a small nucleus of thinkers and doers with well-developed intellectual capital. These officers received both a firm grounding in military history and the institutional encouragement to use their mental skills. Their achievement was remarkable, since they were in an Army flat on its back in so many ways.

General George C. Marshall was a catalyst for these men while he was assistant commandant at Fort Benning. Afternoon sessions on his porch brought together like-minded officers—students, staff, and faculty—for study and, not incidentally, for Marshall's evaluation. Marshall's biographer, Forrest C. Pogue, has identified over 150 students and 50 instructors from that period who rose to flag rank during World War II. Marshall was not only teaching, but also measuring their performance—and their potential. Earlier, Maj. John C. Morrison at Fort Leavenworth had challenged his students, Marshall among them, to think creatively. He frequently used military history as the wedge to drive



George C. Marshall as a lieutenant colonel (fifth from left, front row) at Fort Benning, 1930-1931.

home a point. To be known as a "Morrison man," Marshall told Dr. Pogue, was a kind of professional pedigree.

The instructive message of the 1920s and '30s is that a handful of leaders had the mental energy and initiative to prepare themselves and others to think about war despite the mental lethargy prevailing in the Army. In *Eagle Against the Sun*, Prof. Ronald Spector suggests that Army officers of the interwar years had a limited strategic grasp. While Navy planners contemplated a wide range of national and global strategic aspects, Army planners confined their horizons to the narrower strategic considerations of mobilization and expansion of the industrial base. Only a few Army officers learned to think about strategy in a broader context, and to form, plan, and execute it. Today's Army is not the Army of the 1920s, nor are the times the same, but the education of some of our officers and the success of those officers in developing a strategic grasp during those lean years is highly instructive for the

Army of today.

In the '90s we need the stimulus to strategic thought that the study of history provides. But is it being applied? We are doing many useful things today with military history that make it a valuable tool in the officer's kit bag. Each aspect of military history has its use: powerful examples of infantry combat emerge from Charles B. MacDonald's *Company Commander* or Clay Blair's *The Forgotten War*, while a staff ride of Chipyeong-ni is an invaluable lesson in resourcefulness, courage, and initiative at the junior level in the Korean War. But what we are doing with military history is not nearly enough.

Where is the stable of intellectual thinkers who would be military strategists? Where are the "Morrison men"? Or, more specifically, where are the Morrises themselves? Forrest Pogue's description of Morrison is instructive: "A prickly original...he was happiest in the master-student relationship and made his greatest appeal to young, uncommitted minds." Those who

understand and can articulate military strategy are few, but invaluable. We need to educate our officers better in the art of military strategy and to give them the encouragement, prominence, and access necessary to put the uniformed military strategist at the forefront of military thinkers.

We need acknowledged strategists who can influence key constituencies--junior leaders, Congress, and the American public, among others. Curiously enough, if we were to measure the prominence accorded to Army leaders today, the front rank of military thinkers would probably be occupied by those skilled in budget warfare and force development campaigns. The second rank would include those creating the operational art--as we call it today. While there is no quarrel with the importance of those subjects, who in Army green speaks for the military strategy of the nation? Who describes the sophisticated, integrated blend of land, sea, and air power formations that can execute the military strategy of the nation? The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff does--and must--because of where he sits. Similarly, the chief of staff of the Army speaks, writes, and testifies to that same end. But where are the intellectual, uniformed wise men to back up the ongoing work of articulating a military strategy--and who are they? Today there are precious few. Some of those who emerge do so only after they retire. In the early decades of the nuclear era, we left the field of nuclear strategy largely to civilians. To their credit, they carried the debate at the national and international levels as those of us in uniform hung back. A curious malady has developed among those in Army green that presumes there is something unsoldierly about an officer who grows to intellectual stature in the business of military strategy, especially the aspects of strategy that require an Army officer to understand and articulate maritime strategy and air power thoroughly. Yet, in the dark period of the 1920s and 1930s, a small number of officers while still at relatively junior rank undertook that growth on their own.

As Army officers, we consistently take a cautious, conservative approach in articulating our grasp of strategy. It is time to take our responsibilities more seriously and to apply our study of military history to the strategic discussion. We need to break out of our present mold. And we need to do it now.

Maj. Gen. Gerald P. Stadler is commandant of the National War College in Washington. In a subsequent article, he will address how the shortage of strategists developed--and how the Army can solve the problem.

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The Chief's Corner

Harold W. Nelson

Thoughts on "Official History"

One of the principal audiences for our publications consists of veterans who have firsthand knowledge of subjects we address. Inevitably, a few of them challenge our facts or interpretations. Lively exchanges ensue. When an error is discovered it is corrected in subsequent printings, but often the new evidence offered by the veteran does not convince us that we should make a change. At that point the exchanges sometimes become acrimonious, often because some of our correspondents apparently do not understand "official military history" as the Army does in publishing it.

Most of us who have had some opportunity to consider the matter realize that the military historian's craft has elements of both science and art. Where facts dominate (Was a unit in the order of battle? What was the TO&E? What were the technical characteristics of a weapon?) science will prevail. When we move into areas of interpretation (Was the unit well led? Was it trained in the use of its weapons and equipment? Did it emplace its weapons wisely?) art dominates, and different beholders will take differing views of the historian's product.

In the years after World War I, the Army limited its official historians to facts, publishing only documents and orders of battle. The modern narrative tradition began during World War II because the volume of documents, the scope of the war effort, and the duration of the conflict gave professional historians an opportunity to produce studies that would help future officers understand the complexities of modern warfare. These studies are "official" in the sense that taxpayers funded them and their authors had special access to the historical record, but they are nothing more than that.

I am especially interested in maintaining this limited definition of our "official history" effort because of my background as a Russian and Soviet historian. My studies taught me many things about the power of history and the power of officials. There can be no "Party Line" when there is educated discourse. There can be no educated discourse where "official" versions of the past are held to be superior because they claim governmental provenance.

When the Army's historians publish historical narrative, the professional historian has been immersed in the evidence for a prolonged period and has then mar-

shaled facts to fit a reasonable interpretive framework. The resulting draft is subjected to a review by a panel of experts, but the product is still the product of individual creativity and is appropriately credited. The Center of Military History stands behind the published work, but we do not pretend that it is immune to criticism or possible revision.

While engaging in dialogue with critics and potential revisionists, we will seldom undertake major new research to transform our part of the dialogue into new publications. We subscribe to the philosophical tradition that undergirds our nation's strength: People have the right to marshal facts to defend differing points of view. Throughout our publishing process everyone knows that facts exist which will not be cited and other interpretations can be supported with or without those facts. We stand ready to facilitate the research of those who would dispute our interpretations and fully expect them to publish their views. Our interpretations may then coexist with these alternative views in the marketplace of ideas. By claiming no more than this for our histories, they can make a unique contribution to scholarly progress without pretending to be the end of the constant inquiry characterizing our profession's traditional approach to its work.

Editor's Journal

In the aftermath of our fire, there was a four-week delay before the summer issue appeared, but *Army History* is now firmly back on schedule. I want to thank all of you who have continued to submit articles. For those who are considering contributing to *Army History*, please keep in mind that we use WORDPERFECT software. It would greatly facilitate matters if your submission could be in WP 5.0 or 4.2. No matter which word processing package is used, however, I would be very grateful if you could include a disk with your hard copy submission.

Some of the articles I receive include accompanying photographs. Generally speaking, these cannot be returned. If you absolutely must have your pictures back, please let me know--it will be several months before I can return your photographs.

Once again, thank you for your continued interest and support.

A. G. Fisch, Jr.

Low Intensity Conflict

John Schlight

The warrior ethic, America's annihilative proclivities in times of war, and our penchant for rapid and dramatic results have at times coalesced to skew the concept of low intensity conflict (LIC) further in the direction of combat than the term implies. The warrior ethic, which accords to military combat a central position in foreign struggles, tends to confuse "conflict" with "combat." As a result, among the ever-increasing number of writings on low intensity conflict, disproportionate attention is sometimes paid to small military wars, such as the Libyan strike or the recent invasion of Panama, which have little--or nothing--to do with low intensity conflict. The "conflict" in LIC is not combat, and low intensity conflicts are not necessarily small wars. The resort to combat can, in fact, signal the denouement of low intensity conflict.

This tendency to confuse conflict and combat is intensified by classifying wars as being of low, mid, or high intensity. The implication is that these are three ascending levels of the same thing. Nothing could be farther from the truth. These are low-, medium-, and high-intensity wars. LIC can exist at all three levels.

The important distinction between conflict and combat tends to be further obscured by the inclusion of both LIC (conflict) and Special Operations (primarily combat) in one Pentagon secretariat--the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict. While the two functions are at times complementary, particularly in the area of psychological operations, they are qualitatively distinct and provide radically different approaches to the same objective.

What, then, is a low intensity conflict? In the view of the Department of Defense, an LIC is a protracted struggle of competing ideologies waged with a combination of political, economic, psychological, social, informational, and military instruments.

Several elements in this description run counter to traditional military thinking. Protracted struggle has, for both historical and political reasons, been anathema to Western strategists. The very nature of our bureaucratic structure has made it difficult for the military to enter wholeheartedly into political, economic, or social reconstruction in foreign lands, not to mention at home. There are, in the conventional military perception, other agencies better trained and equipped to do this.

A key phrase in the Department of Defense description of LIC is the last one--military instruments. What can be overlooked is that the military instruments called

into play here are *noncombat* military measures, such as security assistance, intelligence, communications, civic action, psychological operations, and engineering, medical, and logistical support. Those who view low intensity conflicts as small wars miss this crucial point.

Two factors present obstacles to the use of these noncombat military measures. The first, as noted above, is the historical reluctance on the part of both military and civilian officials to undertake programs that they judge to be outside their area of responsibility. Bureaucratic loyalties, contrasting budgeting systems, and interagency rivalry are often posited as barriers to such integration. While these impediments are real and tenacious, they are not insuperable. We have only to look into the creation of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) in Vietnam to see how, with sufficient determination, the two can be melded.

The second obstacle is perhaps more difficult to surmount. By their very nature military combat operations frequently cancel out progress made by military and civilian pacification efforts. The often unavoidable destruction that accompanied the American combat effort in Vietnam did little to convince the inhabitants that we were there to support reconstruction of their country. This situation occurred at least in part because the destruction took place largely before an integrated pacification program took hold. Close planning between combat and noncombat operations from the outset can prevent much of these counterproductive effects.

What types of conflicts can be characterized as being of low intensity? The Joint Chiefs of Staff have enumerated four: insurgency/counterinsurgency, terrorism, peace-keeping operations, and peacetime contingencies. A fifth category--counternarcotic operations--is gradually joining the list.

The military has a noncombat role to play in each of these types of situation. Whether combating or supporting an insurgency, advice, civic affairs operations, intelligence, psychological operations, and security assistance are critical. Equally important are informational measures aimed at determining the root cause of the insurgency--the political and economic discontents.

Noncombat military support for both antiterrorism and counterterrorism can take the form of law enforce-

ment; reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence for threat warning; and education and awareness training.

Peace-keeping operations support diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain peace in areas of actual or potential conflict. Here again military intelligence, education through informational programs, logistics, and civic actions can further these objectives.

The military can provide essential support in peacetime contingency operations through intelligence operations, humanitarian assistance, evaluation of non-combatants, surges in security assistance, rescue and recovery operations, and other forms of support to U.S. civil authorities. Intelligence, education, and security assistance all play a part in the current war against the drug traffic.

Common to all of these endeavors is the predominance of political, economic, psychological, and informational measures over military combat operations. In low intensity conflict, combat forces are employed only as a last resort, and then only when vital national interests cannot otherwise be adequately protected.

Where can the student of military history go to explore this relatively new and burgeoning field of study? The doctrine of LIC is still being developed within the Department of Defense and the uniformed services. Therefore, a good starting place is the unclassified draft doctrinal publications and manuals of these agencies. Joint Chiefs of Staff publication 3-07, *Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict*, and joint Army/Air Force FM 100-20/AFM 2-20, *Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict*, discuss the basic categories and definitions and describe the activities that can be conducted in an LIC environment.

The Center for Low-Intensity Conflict, located at

Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, is well along with its program of publishing monographs on every phase of low intensity conflict. These unclassified volumes flesh out in detail the major aspects of the manuals. They provide the added advantage of being written by the authors of the Joint Chiefs of Staff publication on the subject. These publications include valuable bibliographies which serve as guides to further reading.

Articles in military journals abound. Frequently journals devote entire issues to the subject, e.g., *Military Review*, Volume LXX (January 1990), No. 1. These are supplemented by studies and papers produced at the services' war colleges. Scholarly work done at the Army Center of Military History by Thomas Scoville and Dr. Richard Hunt on the CORDS experiment illustrate the difficulties and promises inherent in combining civilian and military programs and personnel to achieve the objectives of low intensity conflict.

Before the twentieth century's trend toward totality in warfare, the U.S. Army had extensive experience with low intensity conflict. Examples of LIC are to be found during the Indian Wars, the pacification of the Philippines, and some aspects of the American Civil War. Since low intensity conflict can exist as a substratum of conventional war, however, the student of military history can also discover many of its aspects in the two world wars, during the Korean conflict, and in Vietnam.

Dr. John Schlight is the former chief of the Center's erstwhile Low Intensity Conflict Branch of Histories Division. He is the author of the Office of Air Force History's volume The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive, 1965-1968.

General Maxwell Taylor and His Successful Campaign Against the Strategy of Massive Retaliation

Mark Edmond Clark

Today, the official defense policy of the United States requires military forces that are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression across the entire spectrum of potential conflict. Readiness, sustainability, sound force disposition, and a comprehensive and imaginative integration of the U.S. and allied military capabilities are characteristic of the current defense posture. (1)

Similar efforts had been made during the years following the end of World War II to structure the nation's defense policy, yet such efforts were not always harmonious or satisfactory.

Initially, in the postwar period each branch of the armed forces received a symmetrical share of the defense budget. This balanced approach to defense was part of President Harry Truman's deterrence policy.

This policy recognized that the goal of victory over one's opponents solely through warfare was outmoded. Military power had to be dispersed in such a way as to prevent wars from beginning.

When Dwight D. Eisenhower became president in 1953, he adhered to a similar deterrence policy. With regard to the military posture, however, he took a drastic step in another direction. In order to make the U.S. deterrent more effective and economical, he implemented the "New Look," which placed a heavy reliance upon the Air Force and its atomic capability. That capability was concentrated in the Strategic Air Command, with its fleet of bombers ready to drop atomic bombs on enemy targets. By 1954 the New Look developed into a strategy known as "massive retaliation," which, according to then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, placed more reliance on deterrent power and less dependence on local defensive forces. He further stated that it relied on a "great capacity to retaliate instantly by means and at times of our own choosing." (2)

As a result of the massive retaliation strategy, the Air Force began to receive the bulk of appropriations and authorizations for defense. Despite the draft, this had the effect of causing the Army and the Navy to shrink in size and strength. As the Army dwindled, its leadership began to fear receiving a permanent secondary role in the military posture and the national military strategy, but feared even more that the U.S. defense was being placed in jeopardy. The Army leadership believed that the nation would not be able to meet every contingency with atomic weapons. A capability had to exist that would allow the nation to respond militarily across the spectrum of warfare to a variety of situations.

During this period the Army leadership concentrated on the development of new ideas. In their minds, a solution was needed to help the service and to effect a change in the erroneous policy of relying on massive retaliation. The man who provided the answer for the Army was General Maxwell D. Taylor. General Taylor was named Army chief of staff in 1955. Through his direction the military posture and the national military strategy were altered, the Army was established as a primary element in that posture and strategy, and the Modern Army was created.

One of the greatest challenges that the U.S. military leadership has faced in the past few decades is that of having civilian authorities base the nation's military posture and strategy on nonmilitary factors. The previous administration's embrace of the Strategic Defense Initiative for visionary appeal, rather than pragmatic military reasons, is a recent example. What follows is an examination of General Taylor's efforts to rees-

tablish the position of the Army in the U.S. military posture and to rectify the design of the national military strategy, during and after his tenure as Army chief of staff from 1955 to 1959. It discusses his campaign to generate more favorable opinions from, and to alter the policy of, civilian authorities, and reviews his formulation and implementation of an innovative approach to achieve those goals. Further, the paper discusses the Army modernization that resulted from those efforts, and how General Taylor used his experiences, insight, and professional technique to direct the change.

Born the son of a railroad lawyer in Keytesville, Missouri, in 1901, Maxwell Davenport Taylor grew to be a man of extraordinary talents. As a youth he possessed a strong intellectual capacity and a desire to learn that were evident in his academic achievements. He won his high school debating championship and finished high school at the age of sixteen. In 1922 Taylor graduated fourth in his class at the U.S. Military Academy, where his class yearbook called him "the most learned of the graduates." (3)

Taylor began his career as an officer with a five-year tour in Hawaii. He returned to the Military Academy to teach languages from 1927 to 1932. During that time, he learned to speak five languages fluently and could understand two others. That facility enabled Taylor to spend most of the remaining between-the-war years in China and Japan as a military attache, as well as in various European and Latin American capitals on semidiplomatic assignments.

As the Second World War drew nearer, Taylor was given more conventional military assignments. He helped to organize the Army's first airborne division, the 82d, and was eventually given command of the 101st Airborne Division during the war. On D-Day Taylor jumped with his troops, and he was the first general officer to land in Normandy.

From 1945 to 1949 Taylor served in the more peaceful position of superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy, but in later years he would eventually be thrust into every hot spot around the world. He became commander of the U.S. military government and Army forces in Berlin in 1949. After two years in that assignment he was made a deputy chief of staff. In 1953 he was given command of the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea. Two years later he became commander in chief of the United States and United Nations Far Eastern Command. Taylor had served in that assignment for only four months, however, when he was named U.S. Army chief of staff in July 1955.

As a fighting hero, an accepted intellectual, and an astute political person, yet without political ambitions, Taylor ran counter to the then prevailing civilian im-

ages of military officers as inarticulate men of narrow interests, or men who were technicians and traditionalists with concepts of patriotism drawn from textbooks. (4) Given his soft-spoken suavity, Taylor possessed a considerable ability to stand out and draw attention. (5) Civilian acknowledgment of Taylor as someone special took the form of numerous honorary engineering and law degrees from leading universities, as well as other accolades.

Since he exerted some influence outside the Army and outside the government, many fellow officers expected Taylor, while he served as chief of staff, to use the office to cause a change in the nation's military posture and strategy that would eliminate massive retaliation and help their service. (6) Some even called upon him to fight vigorously with the executive authority. Although he was greatly concerned with these issues, Taylor saw the futility of such an approach to the problem. Indeed, he needed only to recall the experience of his predecessor as Army chief of staff, General Matthew B. Ridgway, to be assured of his opinion.

Ridgway had been a constant dissenter against massive retaliation. (7) He openly argued that the Eisenhower administration's decision to base U.S. defense needs on the Air Force's strategic bombing capability and atomic weapons overlooked the possible threat of limited wars and low intensity conflict. Ridgway's views were resented by then Secretary of State Charles E. Wilson, and for a time, efforts were made to keep the general from voicing his views where they would become public. (8) As time passed, Ridgway was seen more and more as a serious problem. Even though he was a highly qualified military officer, Ridgway was forced into retirement. (9)

One of Taylor's first realizations was that persuading civilian authorities in the administration to change the military posture and the national military strategy was a very difficult thing to do. Clearly, it was not a matter of selecting a posture or strategy that was better. Rather, it was a matter of providing a military force and a strategy that, first, supported the national strategy developed by an administration in office, and, second, complied with the national policy, which was defined as a broad course of action or statement of guidance adopted by government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives.

When Dwight Eisenhower became a candidate for the presidency, among his many promises were economy of operation and a more effective military posture. His stand on defense dovetailed with his pledge of security with solvency. (10) The New Look, which placed more reliance upon the Air Force's Strategic Air Command, provided that means. (11) The United

States had been too far extended in Korea with its land and naval forces pinned down. The use of a flexible, mobile strategic reserve was the best way to supplement allied forces in the future.

Given the views of the Eisenhower administration on the nation's needs, its decision to adhere to massive retaliation was understandable. Much as General Ridgway believed, Maxwell Taylor acknowledged that the strategic realities, which led the administration to make such a decision, were poorly considered. (12) He explained: "The deterrence of war in this age of high yield weapons is the greatest challenge that this nation has ever faced. It is no longer a task that can be entrusted solely to the soldier, the statesman or the diplomat, because the deterrence of conflict rests on the concerted efforts of all Americans. If we are to deter the great catastrophe of another world conflict we can do so only by the unified efforts of all of us--each contributing according to his station. Only by merging all our strength, military, economic, political and moral--in harmonious and effective combination, can one ensure the future of America and the peace of the world. Militarily, this integrated effort requires not one single form of military force, but a tridimensional balance of forces applicable to objectives on land, at sea, and in the air. It demands a political-military strategy flexibly adjusted to the needs of unforeseen situations, not geared to any single weapons system or single concept of future war. In short, it should embrace all reasonable measures to prevent general and local war, and at the same time contain the potentiality of waging any war, large or small, in such a way as to achieve our national objectives." (13)

General Taylor was against the idea of creating a defense with a goal of economizing or limiting its impact on society. In his opinion, the defense of the nation was a concern for everyone, and all citizens, in some way, should play a role in its maintenance. Taylor considered his views to be more appropriate to the times than those of the administration, yet he knew that his opinions were all meaningless unless he could convince administration officials and other civilian authorities of the need for change.

Taylor accepted the fact that he had to "sell" his concepts of a more flexible response. Since selling was the operative word, he turned to an innovative solution, which was to employ marketing strategies and tactics similar to those used by U.S. companies. Marketing was key in effecting the constant corporate growth which dominated the period. Taylor hoped that it would allow for the much-needed promotion of his concepts, and, additionally, that it would promote an expanded role for the Army, so that it could play its

indispensable part as a member of a tridimensional team and as the nation's primary land force.

Marketing is the performance of business activities which direct the flow of goods and services from producer to consumer or user in order to satisfy customers and achieve a company's objectives. (14) To reach that goal, the marketing manager is concerned with directing specific functions or activities to complete a specific mission. Placing himself in the role of marketing manager, General Taylor had the responsibility of using a quasi-marketing plan to sell his concepts and the "service" provided by the Army, since in a sense, the branches of the armed forces provide the nation with the service of defense.

However, marketing a service to particular customers--in this case the civilian authorities in and out of the administration--is not the simple task of making an offer. The marketing concept may call for reorienting a firm's way of doing things. (15) Instead of trying to get customers to buy what the firm has produced, a marketing-oriented company would try to sell what the customers want. Thus, at times a company's products or services must be altered to satisfy those needs. Those initial changes may include adjustments in the company's organizational structure or in the company's management methods and procedures. (16) Such changes in the Air Force placed it in a position to be the dominant factor in the U.S. military posture after World War II.

In the postwar period the military was saddled with an international mission focused on the Soviet Union and Soviet-supported aggression. The Air Force had quickly defined its role in that period through its strategic bombing capability and atomic weapons. It was the image of the Strategic Air Command flying around the world in the role of the airborne policeman and using the slogan "Peace Is Our Profession" that managed to impress the Eisenhower administration. (17)

Restructuring the Army in order to reestablish its role in the military posture and national military strategy became General Taylor's initial focus. Taylor had to present an Army that was equally as effective and impressive as the Air Force. This approach required a product development strategy aimed at developing new products or services for customers in the present market. (18) As for the changes that had to be made, Taylor noted: "The Army must ensure that its forces are fully prepared and equipped to fight a war with or without nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. To retain a constant state of readiness and concurrently to modernize Army forces as quickly as possible with budgetary means, new material must be phased into the Army's

supply system, and the old must be phased out over a period of years." (19)

Through a newly devised strategy, the Army would seek to cope with anything from conventional warfare, which included the use of atomic warfare, to unconventional warfare--generally concerned with counterinfiltration operations. In their conventional role, Army combat divisions would be required to assemble rapidly from dispersed areas to widely deployed formations. Those forces would concentrate quickly and in sufficient strength to halt an enemy with firepower and counterattacks. (20) Atomic weapons had become an integral element in the planning of land warfare, and their introduction onto the battlefield was thought to be inevitable. (21)

The restructuring of Army units to meet these requirements was difficult to plan. The structure of Army divisions had evolved from the square division of World War I through the triangular division and to the regimental combat team formation of the Second World War and Korea. (22) A great amount of combat experience had gone into the evolution. To meet the requirements of the modern age, Maxwell Taylor could only work from a mental image of the future battlefield, for atomic weapons had never been used before in a tactical mode. He explained: "I visualize that the atomic battlefield of the future will have much greater breadth and depth than battlefields of the past. There will probably be a checkerboard disposition of units with considerable gaps between combat elements. Consequently, all Army units must be trained for all around combat in the same way that we trained and fought our airborne divisions in World War Two." (23) From that mental image, the pentomic division was developed as a new Army tactical concept.

The shift to the pentomic division structure affected every active Army combat division. In the Infantry branch, the structure was known as the Reorganized Combat Infantry Division (ROCID); in the Armor branch it was known as the Reorganized Combat Armored Division (ROCAD); and for airborne divisions, it was known as the Reorganized Tactical Airborne Division (ROTAD). The effects of the reorganization were radical. In the infantry division, for example, the pentomic reorganization reduced the strength of the division by 3,700 troops without losing a man in rifle platoon strength. (24) The military division maneuver element was changed from three regiments to five battle groups, which were about 39 percent of the size of the regiments and allowed for increased mobility and reduced susceptibility to atomic attack. The infantry battalion was eliminated, but the rifle company was strengthened. (25) A cavalry squad-

ron--formerly the reconnaissance battalion--was added, and the armored battalion was organized into five companies. Artillery weapons were decreased; however, they now possessed the capacity to deliver atomic rounds.

The reorganized units were the best means to cope with an invading Soviet force, especially in Europe where the Army faced its greatest overseas mission. There, localized Soviet probes and hostilities were envisioned to test the resolve of NATO forces. Rather than letting the Strategic Air Command strike back with a massive atomic attack against the probes, the Army's forces, armed with a variety of sophisticated low-yield atomic weapons, would gradually, along with their attack, apply the weapons to the intruding Soviets until a point was reached where the invaders would cease their unprofitable aggression. (26)

The ability to provide land forces in Europe with a capability to fight and win was a great benefit of the newly reconstructed Army--the accepted notion of "trip wires" or token ground forces could be put aside. This was all in accord with Taylor's view that "the aggregate strength of indigenous and U.S. Army forces in vital strategic areas such as Western Europe must be sufficient to provide a strong forward shield capable of repelling an attack by Communist armies.... Significant ground forces are needed to prevent a forward surge of hostile land forces seeking safety from our atomic weapons by a quick intermingling with our defensive units. In addition, they must be strong enough to gain for us the reaction time necessary to deliver retaliatory blows. Nuclear weapons themselves cannot replace these ground forces. These weapons can, however, strengthen the ground forces through their improved firepower and thereby contribute to the ground deterrent." (27)

Beyond Europe, a capability to fight conventional wars around the world was provided with the creation of the United States Strategic Army Corps (STRAC). Based in the continental United States, the force stood ready to meet or to reinforce any initial emergency requirements. STRAC was composed of the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions and the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions, which gave it a total strength of over 125,000 troops. Command facilities were provided by the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters. (28) Its mobility was provided by Air Force and Navy units earmarked for such service.

In its unconventional role of containing Communist aggression or blocking wars of rebellion against friendly governments, the Army's activities included the increased use of military assistance advisory groups

overseas. They were to be augmented by additional technicians and specialists established to advise local forces on combat operations. Later, if necessary, these advisory groups would serve as the nucleus around which an increased Army involvement could be developed. Such peace-keeping efforts were to be short-lived, carefully controlled military actions, and sharply restricted to achieving specific and limited tactical objectives within narrowly defined geographic areas. (29)

To Taylor, the development of a counterinfiltration capability was crucial to restructuring the Army. This view is understandable when one considers the nature of U.S. commitments overseas at that time. In discussing this matter, Taylor noted: "We have pledged ourselves to assist, under varying terms, some fifty foreign nations that may be threatened by Communist aggression. We are a participating member in twelve regional pacts, designed to develop collective strength to oppose aggression. Under the Military Aid Program, we are providing assistance to forty-three countries, whom we regard as friends and allies. In many of the countries, we maintain military missions for the purpose of assisting and training their troops to use our equipment. For example, the United States Army today is engaged, directly or indirectly, in the training of some two hundred foreign divisions. These data are suggestive of the extent of our current foreign commitments and the need to verify from time to time that we do indeed have ready strength to make good on these commitments if they ever should fall due, singly or together." (30)

While changes were made within the Army's combat units, great changes were also being made in areas such as personnel. This would be the normal result of a marketing plan similar to Taylor's in a U.S. company. Once a plan is developed for accomplishing a company's objectives, an effort is made to focus all the company's energy to that plan. This may require altering the attitudes of company personnel. (31) Thus, for example, in Taylor's *Modern Army* the Army officer was soon recognized as a professional advocate of change. The *Modern Army* was a place for new ideas. Individuals who had a driving desire to propel themselves constantly onward and upward were sought for important positions, as it became seemingly unacceptable to be content with a position or rank. (32)

At the heart of Army education, the U.S. Military Academy, an engineering content was still emphasized. The study of languages was increased, however, and social sciences found their way into the curriculum, mainly in the form of military economics and the analysis of the balance of power in international rela-

tions. (33) The Army even began to encourage young officers to go on to civilian schools for postgraduate studies.

Beyond being a result of the overall plan, these personnel changes helped to fulfill Taylor's desire to have a Modern Army that was an intelligent Army. Such an Army would include individuals who were exercising their mental and physical capabilities to the best of their ability. Taylor remarked: "Progress is measured not only in physical standards, but in mental norms as well. The Modern Army is an increasingly complex organization in terms of its equipment and its operational procedures. I have often had occasion to say that it has a place for men of all skills and all attainments. We need the artisan, the repairman, the scientist, the combat leader, the scholar, yes, even the genius will find a task appropriate to his capacity." (34)

Throughout the late 1950s the Army produced its new image. Taylor managed to develop the Modern Army and improve the service's preparedness for limited wars. Equally important to the successful reorganization and modernization, however, was the confirmation of Taylor's concept of the nation's military posture and national military strategy. World events in that period demonstrated that the deterrent strength of the nation could not be unidimensional. Despite the existence of the massive retaliation strategy, unfriendly forces were able and confident enough to wage war in Greece, Korea, Malaya, and Indochina, and to commit hostile acts such as the tragic developments in Hungary.

Because of the gravity of these events, Taylor was not the only government official to recognize their significance. In a speech in 1957 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles conceded the need for a limited war capability. (35) Under this premise, he created the great system of alliances which strengthened the capability of allies to meet aggression and reduced the need to retaliate massively. However, despite this recognition of the need for flexibility, the massive retaliation strategy remained in place.

The administration's continued stance against real change left Taylor quite chagrined. As the end of his tenure as chief of staff neared in 1959, he began to speak out publicly. Until that time, Taylor had managed to refrain from engaging in the public dissent that could have irritated Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, or his successor, Neil M. McElroy. (36) However, the time had now come for Taylor to make his position clear, and he focused his energies to that end.

Taylor complained about the Eisenhower administration's acceptance of the problem of the military's inability to respond properly to world events,

and he demanded that more be done to develop a limited war capability. He stated that "although we have significant assets now to cope with limited wars, these can and must be improved so that it can be made crystal clear to both our friends and foes that we can respond promptly with proper weapons and proper forces to any challenge." (37) To speed up the proposed improvements, it was Taylor's view that the United States should embark on a "Five Point Program" to give it the capability to meet the possible challenges posed by limited war. The crucial points of the program outlined were: "(1) the modernization of appropriate equipment; (2) the improved strategic mobility of limited war forces; (3) the preplanned use of air and sealift; (4) expanded joint planning and training; and (5) the publicizing of our limited war strength once it is a reality." (38)

Although his efforts had placed him in a much stronger position than Ridgway had been in when he argued his cause, Taylor could not persuade the Eisenhower administration that the undue reliance on strategic air power was a "false god." (39) Taylor retired from the Army, took a position as chairman of the board of the Mexican Power and Light Company, and later became president of the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts. But for him the fight was not over. Indeed, he decided to go totally public with his views. He held firm to the belief that the "Army will never be able to fulfill its essential role unless it always has clearly expressed missions and firm, timely assurance of the men, money, and material necessary for their discharge. The Army needs the enlightened support of officials and citizens who understand the need for a steady military policy uninfluenced by short-term considerations." (40)

This new approach in no way deviated from his original goals--Maxwell Taylor had merely turned to a hard sell. He began something similar to an advertising campaign. His efforts were aided by the fact that they coincided with a significant anti-massive-retaliation movement that had sprouted.

This movement actually began as early as 1955. Its participants were mostly civilian experts in the defense community. They had endorsed with fervor the notion that the best way to prevent nuclear war was to build up large conventional forces to employ instead of strategic nuclear forces. Articles written by these individuals could always be found on the market. (41)

The Council on Foreign Relations became involved in the cause. It organized a study of the problems of the massive retaliation strategy and endorsed Dr. Henry Kissinger's 1957 book, *Nuclear*

Weapons and Foreign Policy, which virtually presented the movement's platform. (42) The crucial points of the book were that the United States must retain its capability to retaliate in an all-out atomic attack, if sufficiently provoked, but it must also be prepared to retaliate in a more limited fashion against provocations that were limited. In effect, it stated that the nation must be ready to wage limited wars with conventional forces and, if necessary, with small atomic weapons. (43)

The level of the massive retaliation movement made it clear that--in marketing terms--the macro-environment was changing. In marketing the macro-environment may include the economic, technological, cultural, social, legal, political, and competitive environments. Changes in the macro-environment can have consequences such as changes in market preferences that can provide new product opportunities or lead customers to substitute one product for another. (44) Taylor had an opportunity to take advantage of the change in the macro-environment and complete his mission. Determined as he was to achieve his goals, that was exactly what General Taylor attempted to do.

The key to Taylor's new publicity offensive was "negative campaigning." He expressed his discontent with what he considered to be "declining military strength at a time of increased political attention." (45) He charged that the "defense of the United States was presently controlled by non-military factors which have become outmoded." (46) Further, he was also highly critical of budgetary factors and concepts of military posture that had reduced the Army to an authorized troop strength of 870,000. Many of Taylor's criticisms and other remarks were placed in his book, *The Uncertain Trumpet*. (47)

As public recognition of Taylor increased, he had little problem gaining significant influence with civilian authorities such as Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, then the U.S. Senate majority leader. Johnson, who was the leading Democrat in the Senate, was already committed to an anti-massive-retaliation stance, and sought to find greater faults with the Eisenhower administration's defense policy. This made him an ideal ally for Taylor. Johnson readily accepted Taylor's concepts on preparing the Army to meet challenges across the entire spectrum of war and on the importance of having a more flexible response to Communist and Communist-backed aggression. He formed the Preparedness Investigatory Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services to examine Taylor's criticisms of the Eisenhower administration and his comments on the Army's development.

The subcommittee reported that to "be effective it [the military posture] must contain forces capable of defeating potential enemies in any type of conflict they might undertake ranging through the entire spectrum of warfare from limited war, in its many forms, to global all out nuclear warfare. Each segment of the deterrent must maintain the required combat efficiency, or the deterrent will be weakened as a chain is no stronger than its weakest link." (48) The subcommittee found no fault with the pentomic reorganization, noting in fact that during World War II and Korea the Army had a standard of organization and maneuver that resulted in roads being clogged and congested, men and equipment concentrated, and clearly defined front lines. None of these conditions could exist in the future as long as the use of atomic weapons was being considered. The major problem that the subcommittee found, however, was the critical lack of men and equipment available to make the pentomic divisions effective. (49) Combat units had not been substantially reequipped since World War II. The subcommittee discovered that the type of weapons needed were in existence, but the Eisenhower administration failed to produce and issue them to the troops in the field. (50)

Through his association with Johnson, Taylor attracted the attention of even more civilian authorities, with whom he shared his assessment of U.S. defense needs from a military point of view. Among those individuals who then began to associate themselves with Taylor was presidential candidate Senator John F. Kennedy. Kennedy saw Taylor's limited war plans--by that time known as the flexible response strategy--as an excellent alternative to massive retaliation and a potential low profile way to mix tangible military force with U.S. diplomacy in lesser developed areas of the world. (51)

When Kennedy became president he fully accepted the Army's modernization plans and programs, which were directed at developing a limited war capability, and adopted the flexible response strategy. Kennedy named Robert S. McNamara, who embraced all of the limited war concepts, as his secretary of defense, and brought Taylor back into the government to serve as his personal adviser on military affairs. Shortly afterward, Taylor came out of Army retirement to become chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Kennedy administration then proceeded to make the strategic nuclear force more secure, but concentrated on building up greater conventional forces in order to diminish the reliance on that nuclear force. (52)

Clearly the six years of Taylor's life spent planning, developing, and marketing his views were not in

vain. He managed to modernize the Army and improve its limited war capability and, although he may not have solely created the issue of limited war versus massive retaliation, he helped to keep it alive. Eventually, Taylor developed a military strategy based on limited war concepts known as flexible response, which became part of the defense policy of the Kennedy administration. Because of his great efforts, he was given a very influential advisory position in that administration—a position he had not sought, but which led him to the highest military post in the United States.

Certainly, it is the choice of civilian authorities in any administration whether or not to heed the counsel of the military leadership. However, if those civilian authorities present the nation with a defense posture that appears to the uniformed services to be inappropriate, it is the responsibility of the military leadership to make their views known, and like Maxwell Taylor, to argue strenuously for the defense that the nation needs.

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Mark Edmond Clark has a masters degree in American history from Columbia and a law degree from Georgetown University. Currently, he is head of his own academic and management consulting firm in New York City.

Notes

1. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Military Posture for FY 1989* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 1.
2. Armin Rappaport, *A History of American Diplomacy* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1975), p. 44; Clark Mollenhoff, *The Pentagon* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1962), p. 162.
3. *World Book Encyclopedia*, 1962 ed., s.v. "Maxwell Davenport Taylor," by H. A. DeWeerd.
4. Jack Raymond, *Power at the Pentagon* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1964), p. 47.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*, p. 291.
7. Mollenhoff, *The Pentagon*, p. 231.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, p. 162.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 163.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 231.
13. *Military Review*, October 1957, p. 10. The state-

ments of Taylor quoted in this paper were taken from editions of *Military Review*, published at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College during his tenure as Army chief of staff. The editors of *Military Review* placed quotes reflecting Taylor's views, and those of other military leaders, in different sections of each edition. The quotes are not attributed, however, to specific speeches or writings. Therefore, Taylor's statements quoted in this paper are simply cited in the same form as the quote cited here.

14. E. Jerome McCarthy, *Basic Marketing: A Managerial Approach*, 5th ed. (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1975), p. 25.

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Ibid.*

17. Edward King, *The Death of the Army: A Pre-Mortem* (New York: Saturday Day Review Press, 1972), p. 63. Although King's book is generally considered a dissenter's view of the Army, the author served as a senior Army staff officer during Taylor's tenure as chief of staff. Despite his negative reflections, he presents a good history of the reorganization and modernization of the Army during this period.

18. Robert Haas, *Industrial Marketing Management*, 3d ed. (Boston: Kent Publishing Company, 1982), p. 127.

19. *Military Review*, January 1958, p. 18.

20. Molenhoff, *The Pentagon*, p. 233.

21. John Cushman, "Pentomic Infantry Division in Combat," *Military Review*, January 1958, pp. 23-29.

22. King, *Death of an Army*, p. 60.

23. *Military Review*, June 1957, p. 38.

24. Cushman, "Pentomic Infantry Division," p. 19.

25. *Ibid.*

26. King, *Death of an Army*, p. 63.

27. *Military Review*, October 1958, p. 17.

28. "Military Notes Around the World," *Military Review*, September 1958, p. 75. The corps was nicknamed "Freedom's Fire Brigade" by its commander, Lt. Gen. William C. Westmoreland. According to Edward King, there was some disagreement in the officer corps about the pentomic reorganization. He was in one of the first groups of lieutenants and captains who were trained to function in the pentomic units at the Infantry School Advanced Course. Allegedly, student officers argued with instructors about the formations. Typical questions included: What have we gained with this formation? Before we could deploy two companies forward to fight and hold a reserve to counterattack—now we have no reserve and must rely on some other battle group to help. What if they can't provide it? What then? King claims to have asked his instructors:

- "Under the present promotion policies, it takes about eighteen years to go from captain to colonel. In this battle group there are only two command levels, company commander or battle group commander. Don't you think this is going to produce some pretty unqualified battle group commanders when they have to wait eighteen years between chances to command?" King, *Death of an Army*, p. 61.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 63, 90.
 30. *Military Review*, December 1958, p. 56.
 31. McCarthy, *Basic Marketing*, p. 25.
 32. King, *Death of an Army*, pp. 59-60.
 33. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), p. 232.
 34. *Military Review*, August 1957, p. 24.
 35. Raymond, *Power at the Pentagon*, p. 248.
 36. Mollenhoff, *The Pentagon*, p. 231.
 37. *Military Review*, March 1959, p. 59.
 38. *Military Review*, February 1959, p. 83.
 39. Raymond, *Power at the Pentagon*, p. 291.
 40. *Military Review*, September 1957, p. 58.
 41. Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1972), pp. 394-95. Among those individuals writing on the subject were B. H. Liddell-Hart, W. W. Coffman, Vannevar Bush, and Bernard Brodie.
 42. *Ibid.*, p. 395; Raymond, *Power at the Pentagon*, p. 248; see also Henry Kissinger's book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper, 1957).
 43. Raymond, *Power at the Pentagon*, p. 248.
 44. C. W. Park and Gerald Zaltman, *Marketing Management* (New York: The Dryden Press, Inc., 1987), p. 98.
 45. Mollenhoff, *The Pentagon*, p. 232.
 46. *Ibid.*
 47. More precisely, Taylor contended in his book that the massive retaliation strategy had endangered the nation's security, that the nation's military planning was frozen to the requirements of general war, and that the weakness in the Joint Chiefs of Staff system had left the planning of our military strategy to civilian amateurs and budget planners--see General Maxwell Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper and Co., 1960). The issue of weakness in the Joint Chiefs system was also of great concern to Taylor because, as Army chief of staff, he had found himself repeatedly outweighed by the then chairman, Admiral Arthur Radford--see Raymond, *Power at the Pentagon*, p. 291. Radford strongly backed the Eisenhower administration's massive retaliation strategy. Bernard Brodie alleges that Radford was the source of many ideas for that strategy--see Brodie, *War and Politics*, p. 394.
 48. Congress, Senate, *Report of the Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services*, 86th Congress, 2d sess., 1960, S. Rpt. No. 16, p. 22.
 49. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
 50. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
 51. King, *Death of an Army*, p. 67. When explaining the flexible response strategy, Taylor stated: "This name [flexible response] suggests the need for a capability to react across the entire spectrum of possible challenges for coping with anything from general atomic war to infiltrations and aggressions such as threaten Laos and Berlin in 1959. The new strategy would recognize that it is just as necessary to deter or win quickly a limited war as to deter general war. Otherwise, the limited war which we cannot win quickly may result in our piecemeal attrition or involvement in an expanding conflict which may grow into the general atomic war we all want to avoid." Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, pp. 6-7.
 52. Brodie, *War and Politics*, pp. 396-97. Shortly after Taylor took the post of Army chief of staff, General Lyman Lemnitzer became Army vice chief of staff. Lemnitzer had inherited the United Nations Command in the Far East from Taylor and considered him his mentor. When Taylor retired in 1959, Lemnitzer succeeded him as chief of staff. Lemnitzer took a strong position for the limited war capability and for Army modernization--*New York Times*, November 13, 1988, p. A44. However, Lemnitzer moved away from the somewhat controversial pentomic division. In its place he implemented the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) structure.
- The new division structure improved organizational flexibility, tactical mobility, nuclear and non-nuclear balance, command and control structure, and the ability to operate with allied forces. The infantry, armored, and mechanized divisions were formed by adding varying mixes of combat maneuver battalions to a common divisional base. The division base included the command and control, reconnaissance, combat support, and administrative support elements. Among the command and control elements were three brigade headquarters that controlled the operations of the attached maneuver battalions--U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to the President of the United States for Fiscal year 1961* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 71.

Fort Leavenworth Frontier Army Museum Exhibits of World War II

Mark K. Megehee

In commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of World War II, the Fort Leavenworth Frontier Army Museum has recently completed a number of World War II-related exhibits, with more in the offing.

Within the context of this anniversary, the Eisenhower Centennial (1890-1990) is being celebrated throughout Kansas and beyond, commemorating a great American president and soldier. In support of the centennial, the museum has installed a traveling exhibit (courtesy of the Eisenhower Library) in the lobby of Bell Hall, the classroom facility of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). In addition, museum personnel consulted with the CGSC library staff to


produce an adjacent display concerning General Eisenhower's experiences at Fort Leavenworth.

The Eisenhower Suite (the original quarters) at Otis Hall has been enhanced with photographs and memorabilia to highlight the quarters associated with the famous general. Further exhibits and displays are being implemented featuring a series of Eisenhower Centennial posters commissioned at Fort Leavenworth. Two more exhibits round out Fort Leavenworth's observance: first, a "Five Star Career" examines Eisenhower's roles as student, Army chief of staff, commander in Europe, NATO commander, and president; second, an exhibit highlighting Eisenhower's successful leadership from D-Day to victory in Europe has been designed for Bell Hall.

Additional curricular-support exhibits emphasize aspects of the Evolution of Modern Warfare course presented at the CGSC--four separate panels per term, interpreting the uniforms, weapons, and equipment of three modern epochs. Term I addresses the period of the American Revolution through World War I. Term II explores weapons systems and their impact on tactics during World War II. The Term III exhibits are designed to survey the modern military era, examining insurgency/counterinsurgency, revolutionary, antiterrorist, and "conventional" style warfare examples of the past forty years.


Last, a major exhibit has recently been completed highlighting the career of General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, who served as a five star general for both the Army and the Air Force. Indeed, his career--to a large extent--has come to symbolize the joint services partnership essential to success in the modern military arena.

These exhibits are a cross-section of the educational program of the Frontier Army Museum, which like sister U.S. Army museums worldwide is committed to military history and excellence in related materiel culture interpretation.



Dwight D. Eisenhower Five Star Career Display

Mark K. Megehee is director of the Frontier Army Museum at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.



General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold Display

The Evolution of Modern Warfare Display



Strategic Planning for World War II

The Victory Plan in Context

Charles E. Kirkpatrick

There are many established stories about American readiness for World War II that emphasize the nation's military unpreparedness and the shortsightedness of the military establishment in the last critical years of peace. Some, like tales of soldiers drilling with wooden rifles and maneuvering with ordinary vehicles bearing signs labeling them "tank," have a basis in fact. Others are apocryphal but allude to deeper truths about the attention Americans have paid their military between the two world wars. One of the most frequently repeated stories of either genre concerns a document known as the "Victory Plan," a mobilization estimate drafted in haste in the summer of 1941. (1)

Conventional wisdom holds that the Victory Plan was an important step forward for the Army because it looked at the problem of mobilizing for war from the point of view of the civilian economy, rather than the demands of military expansion. According to this view, manpower needs of industry took precedence over other considerations as the War Department shifted to a war footing, with the consequence that the author of the Victory Plan scrapped the normal military planning process. A second generalization sees the Victory Plan as a logistical estimate that was most important as it related to industrial production and manpower allocation. (2) Superficially correct, both of these conventional views about the Victory Plan understate the importance of that document and cloud understanding of its significance for the Army and the nation in the Second World War. A closer look at the first assertion about the planning process provides the context in which the second may be considered.

The Planning Process

The Victory Plan resulted from the amalgamation of several requests for information about war materiel. Officers in the War Plans Division, conscious of the need for some estimate to govern military procurement in the event of mobilization, began preliminary studies in the late spring of 1941. About the same time General George C. Marshall, determined to avoid the muddle that characterized World War I mobilization, asked his staff for an appraisal of the types and amounts of equipment and weapons the Army would need for a

major war. Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson, responsible for all Army procurement and needing to lay firm plans to contract with industry, raised essentially the same question in mid-April, a query repeated in early July by the president. Franklin D. Roosevelt, concerned with keeping Britain and the Soviet Union in the war, also wanted the estimate to include the war production requirements for Lend-Lease.

Marshall combined the various requests and sent the requirement to Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, chief of War Plans Division, for an answer. Gerow assigned the task to an obscure infantry major named Albert C. Wedemeyer, giving him roughly three months to compute the total production requirements if the United States went to war, considering "probable enemies, and friends and theaters of operations," as Patterson had phrased it. (3) The job was a large one, and to deal with it, Wedemeyer analyzed the question to determine the information he had to gather.

In order to deduce the nation's ultimate production requirements, he concluded that the essential first task was to compute the size of the Army and Air Corps that the War Department would have to arm and equip. Size and composition of forces were functions of mission, however, and no one could estimate the size of the military forces required without knowing the missions they would be ordered to execute. Missions depended upon military strategy, and in order to know the military strategy, Wedemeyer had first to know the national objective in the event of war. He therefore established for himself a series of questions to answer in order to accomplish his task:

1) What is the national objective of the United States?

2) What military strategy will be devised to accomplish the national objective?

3) What military forces must be raised in order to execute that military strategy?

4) How will those military forces be constituted, equipped and trained?

His methodology implied that by the time he had answered the first three questions, he would have the information he needed to answer the last, which was the objective task he had been given. (4)

Thus his logistics estimate began with a survey of

strategic factors. After careful study of the problems involved, Wedemeyer drafted a simple statement of national objectives and obtained the secretary of war's agreement that he should proceed on the assumption that the United States meant "to eliminate totalitarianism from Europe and, in the process, to be an ally of Great Britain; further, to deny the Japanese undisputed control of the western Pacific." (5) Proceeding from that general statement of political aims, he reviewed the relevant military plans and records of informal Anglo-American conferences and outlined a military strategy that was, in essence, the one followed by the Allies from 1942 through the end of the war.

Wedemeyer's brief sketch delineated necessary American actions to keep the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in the war while the United States built and trained its forces, mobilized a war economy, and built up a base in Great Britain for the eventual attack on Germany. In sum, the United States had to adopt a military strategy that placed the bulk of American combat forces in contact with the enemy in the European theater. In order to accomplish this, the United States had to build and maintain armed forces capable of controlling the sea lanes of communications in two oceans, fight a major land, sea, and air war in one theater, and be sufficiently strong to deter war in the other. No other nation faced the task of building up its Army, Navy, and Air Forces to such standards, to meet such global commitments. Likewise, no other power had to rely upon lines of supply tenuously stretched across oceans, the control of which was still disputed, to bases that had still, in many cases, to be won.

The military strategy appropriate to attainment of the political goals thus dictated the military forces the nation would need. It was here that Wedemeyer first considered the question of manpower allocation. He realized that American economic power was as much a weapon of war as military forces, and that he had to reserve adequate skilled manpower to meet the demands of mobilization and Lend-Lease, as well as to maintain the internal order of the society. Through various calculations he determined that the country could sustain armed forces for around twelve to fourteen million men without jeopardizing other essential war tasks. (6)

He then considered means to wage a war against the armed forces of the Axis that accommodated that limitation, and planned for an armored and mechanized Army that, when used in conjunction with Allied air power, could concentrate decisive mass at any given point to defeat Axis forces. After designing an Army of 215 divisions that could accomplish the missions inher-

ent in the overall national objective, Wedemeyer turned the entire planning document over to the G-4 staff for the mechanical computation of types and quantities of equipment for those divisions. The eventual calculations, combined into a joint study with Navy estimates, became the Joint Army and Navy Board's "Victory Program," and gave the War Department a basis on which to plan production requirements. (7)

Clearly, the customary conclusion that Wedemeyer did not follow the usual military planning process, but began with available manpower, which he distributed in consonance with the nation's military objectives, is not correct. Manpower considerations were certainly prominent, but Wedemeyer began, not with the limiting factor of available forces, but with the greater question of the national goal. The critically important aspect of his planning process was that, after settling the strategic goals of the nation, he pursued the logical, rather than the usual, next question. Traditionally, that had been "What can the Army accomplish with the forces at its disposal?" Instead, he asked: "What sort of forces must the Army have to accomplish these missions?" So doing, he escaped the traditional constraints of budget and limited force structure, recognizing that the nation would not skimp on either if it came to war.

The number of men the services could extract from the civilian economy was a subsidiary question in force design, the third major step in his planning process. Conducting an analysis of the available manpower, he then decided upon the various ways that the Army could multiply the combat power of the divisions it could create. Indeed, fine calculations to distribute draft-age men between industry and armed forces were largely moot, because neither the United States nor its Allies could possibly raise large enough forces to attain the 2:1 numerical superiority over the Axis normally considered necessary to prevail. (8) Regardless, therefore, of the size ground Army the nation could field, Wedemeyer had to find some way to make an inferior force suffice. Superior mobility, superior firepower, and proper use of air power were the answers. (9)

The Victory Plan was therefore not based in the first instance on the industrial needs of the United States, nor did Wedemeyer's thought process begin with the civilian sector. He did not deviate from the strategic planning processes familiar to all his colleagues in War Plans Division. It was nevertheless his awareness of the many valid wartime jobs for a limited pool of high-quality manpower that distinguished him from other mobilization planners. Aware of the importance of Lend-Lease to the war effort and conscious that the Germans both feared and respected American eco-

conomic power, he took special pains to avoid disrupting the industrial work force. Analysts of the Victory Plan therefore justifiably praise him for understanding that the needs of industry were as important as the needs of the Army.

The Import of the Victory Plan

In general terms, the Victory Plan was a remarkably prescient document. In 1941, Wedemeyer estimated that the Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces would need a grand total of 8,795,658 men to fight the war. As the Army was attaining its peak strength in March of 1945, it had a total of 8,157,386 men in uniform--very nearly the figure that Wedemeyer had estimated almost four years earlier. To have calculated the total manpower utilization with such precision is a superficially impressive achievement, although it might more properly be expressed the other way around. The Army eventually used almost exactly the amount of manpower Wedemeyer predicted because his assessment of the amount of *available* manpower was essentially correct, and the Army conceived and fought a style of war that observed that constraint.

In detail, however, the Victory Plan turned out to have many flaws. While correctly computing the total number of men available for the armed forces, Wedemeyer used a distribution formula that did not take account of the increasingly technological nature of warfare. The Army eventually required far more men for maintenance and logistical support than in the past, with the consequence that the combat edge was actually slightly smaller than that of the World War I Army, which had half its total strength. Rather than 215 divisions, the country eventually fielded 90 Army divisions. Similarly, Wedemeyer overestimated the number of mechanized and armored divisions that American industry could equip, especially when it was also building similar weapons for the Allies. The errors in detail, as it turned out, were not important. For purposes of production planning, the estimate was sufficient, despite errors that later became evident in the number and types of divisions the Army would create, to allow industrial planners to set up production lines for very large quantities of materiel, thereby establishing the industrial capacity the United States would need for the rest of the war. As a logistics estimate, the Victory Plan therefore served its purpose. (10).

Because of the context in which it was drafted, most discussions of the Victory Plan refer to it either as a mobilization plan or a logistics estimate. Secretary of War Stimson and General Marshall called it a study of

production requirements for national defense, noting that the estimate of equipment had to proceed from certain strategic assumptions. (11) Wedemeyer himself insisted that the Victory Plan was neither a strategic nor a tactical plan, although strategy provided the framework for estimating production requirements. (12) What emerged from the Army's production estimate in the fall of 1941, however, was far more than a logistics plan, or even a mobilization plan.

The Victory Plan of 1941 was--although not many War Department staff officers realized it while it was being drafted--the blueprint both for the general mobilization of the United States Army for World War II and for the operational concept by which the United States would fight the war. The Victory Plan predicted the future organization for an Army that did not yet exist, outlined combat missions for a war not yet declared, and computed war production requirements for industries that were still committed to peacetime manufacture. It did all of this with remarkable accuracy, considering that the intentions of the United States government were anything but clear in 1941. Very few staff papers have ever had its prescience, its impact, or its far-reaching consequences. Fewer still have dealt so concisely, yet comprehensively, with grand strategic concepts.

Once the United States accepted a role as a world power after World War I, it could no longer rely upon a single mobilization plan that mustered the resources of the nation just to defend the Western Hemisphere. The evolving national policy in 1941 made existing plans obsolete, leading to the hastily conceived Victory Plan. This case points out with particular clarity that no single mobilization plan could possibly serve all contingencies, especially when national policy was in the midst of change. The mission of the armed forces in 1941 changed in consonance with changes in national policy, and those changes demanded greater sophistication and flexibility in military plans. The War Department suddenly faced an international crisis that exceeded the scope of existing war plans, and the Victory Plan was one of the essential first steps in preparing the United States for a war beyond its shores. Wedemeyer's estimate demonstrated a realization that mobilization in the modern era was a complex and dynamic process in which plans had to strike many delicate and interlocking balances--among them the proper balance between conflicting domestic and military manpower priorities and the correct balance between pure manpower and materiel as a means of generating combat power. It was evident to the War Plans Division that all wars in the twentieth century were not

alike, nor would they necessarily break out where most convenient for the defenders. Therefore, rigid plans had to give way to flexible ones that accounted for contemporary circumstances. Thus the Victory Plan superseded the Protective Mobilization Plan of 1939.

The paper was remarkably concise: In only fourteen pages it laid out the strategic objectives of the United States in the event of war, stated American strategic military requirements for such a war, and developed and outlined the force structure to accomplish those tasks. It was therefore far more than just a mobilization plan or a logistics estimate. The Victory Plan was a prism that reflected basic elements of successful military planning. It demonstrated that good planning could not be apportioned in discrete bits or exist solely as abstract calculations, but that each part had to be integrated with the provisions of every other part. The Victory Plan was in effect a comprehensive statement of American strategy that served as a fundamental planning document in preparing the country for war.

Broader Significance

All of these things were significant, but the single most important fact about the Victory Plan had nothing to do with its successes and failures, with the adept planning process by means of which it was written, or with the accuracy and discernment for which it has customarily been praised. Instead, the Victory Plan was important because it typified the outlook of General Marshall and the War Department General Staff, which was never occupied with purely military considerations, but wrote war plans that had a more mature focus.

The Victory Plan is evidence of the early meshing of political and military goals by the American military command structure, as demonstrated by military attention to the manpower needs of the civilian war economy; by military understanding that American eco-

nomie power was itself a powerful military weapon; and by the delineation of military objectives that suited the national goals in the war. Significantly, it demonstrated that the men responsible for outlining America's strategy in the war had a firm grip on all the elements of national strategy, and that they never confused that national strategy with a purely military, and therefore subordinate, strategy. This, rather than any accounting of detailed successes and failures in what was, after all, only an initial draft and never an operational directive, represented the real genius and uniqueness of the Victory Plan. It reflected the broad consensus of American civil-military leaders on what had to be done and set the tone for future high-level planning in the War Department.

Wedemeyer's essential contribution to preparing America for war was that he had an intellect--a carefully educated and prepared intellect--that could grasp the numerous and diverse strands of politics, policy, strategy, and practical military applications and, understanding them, produce a document that reflected the commonly held, but as yet unarticulated strategic vision of America's wartime leaders. When called upon to do so, he had the capacity to write a plan that took account of the contexts of the day: the restrictive and, at times, hostile domestic political environment; the mood of the nation; the condition of the armed forces; and the probable intentions of the nation's political leadership. Within that context, he had a sufficient grasp of the nature of total war to conceive of the military operations the country might be called upon to undertake, and a sufficient grasp of the profession of arms to propose an efficient and effective military organization to accomplish those missions. That, and not the relative successes and failures of the plan in its various details, is the final significance of Albert C. Wedemeyer's work in writing the Victory Plan of 1941.

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Notes

1. The substance of this paper is based upon the conclusions of the author's monograph "An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941," forthcoming from the U.S. Army Center of Military History in 1990.
2. Discussions of the Victory Plan are concentrated in studies that address World War II logistics issues. The viewpoints summarized in this paragraph appear, in

part or in whole, in various general histories of the war as well. These include: Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945* (Washington: Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-212, June 1955); Byron Fairchild and Jonathan Grossman, *The Army and Industrial Manpower* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959); Richard M.

Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955); Ralph Elberton Smith, *The Army and Economic Mobilization* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959); David F. Trask (ed.), "Historical Survey of U.S. Mobilization: Eight Topical Studies of the Twentieth Century" (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, unpublished typescript, n.d.); Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951); Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953); Roland G. Ruppenthal, *Logistical Support of the Armies* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1958); and Mark S. Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington: Department of the Army, Historical Division, 1950).

3. Memorandum, Lt. Col. C. W. Bundy for acting assistant chief of staff, War Plans Division, 20 May 1941, Subj: Coordination of Planning and Supply, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) Record Group (RG) 165, File 4321-12; memorandum, Under Secretary of War Patterson to Secretary of War Stimson, 18 April 1941, Subj: Ultimate Munitions Production Essential to the Safety of America, NARA RG 165, Files WPD 4494 and 43-12; letter, President Roosevelt to the Secretary of War, 9 July 1941, NARA RG 165, entry 234, Box 498, Director of SS&P, G-4 Numerical File 1921-1942, Document #33473; memorandum, President Roosevelt for the Secretary of War, 30 August 1941, NARA RG 165, entry 234, Box 498, Director of SS&P, G-4 Numerical File 1921-1942, Document #33473.

4. The entire discussion of the planning process is based upon the Army's portion of the Victory Plan, contained in two documents, WPD Memorandum, Ultimate Requirements-Ground Forces, 23 August 1941, NARA RG 165, Entry 234, Box 498, Director of SS&P, G-4 Numerical File 1921-1942, Document #33473, and the later Ultimate Requirements Study, Estimate of Army Ground Forces (War Plans Division, GS), September 1941, Folder WPD 4494-14/4494-19,

NARA RG 165; author's interviews with General A. C. Wedemeyer (24 April 1987, 5 May 1987, and 3 June 1987); and A. C. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!* (New York: Henry Holt, 1958).

5. Author's interview with General A. C. Wedemeyer, 24 April 1987.

6. For a detailed analysis of Wedemeyer's computations on manpower availability and troop strength requirements, refer to Chapters 3 and 4, respectively, of "An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941," forthcoming from the Center of Military History, 1990.

7. The final detailed production estimates are contained in Joint Board No. 355 (Serial 707), Army and Navy Estimate of United States Over-all Production Requirements, September 11, 1941, in NARA RG 225.

8. For his assessments of the manpower limitations of the Alliance, see memorandum, Wedemeyer for Gerow, 9 September 1941, OPE Exec. #4, Item #7, NARA RG 165. Manpower, as Wedemeyer knew, was not everything. Citing a relevant case, he observed of the French defeat in 1940 that "Another million men in Flanders would not have turned the tide in the battle for France." Estimate of Army Requirements, p. 8.

9. Estimate of Army Requirements, p. 7. Wedemeyer derived his understanding of these issues from broad reading in military affairs and from his senior military schooling, above all at the German *Kriegsakademie* in 1934-1936, where the course of study emphasized mobile warfare, and where he, like his German peers, read the various works of J. F. C. Fuller. On this point, see the discussion on Wedemeyer's professional education in Chapter 1 of "An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941."

10. Analyses of the successes and failures of the Victory Plan are found in Chapter 5, of "An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941."

11. Press Conference Memorandum, Secretary of War Stimson, 11:45 a.m., 5 December 1941; and Statement by the Chief of Staff, re: Leak of Victory Plan (5 December 1941); both in File WPD 4494-20, NARA RG 165.

12. *Wedemeyer Reports!*, pp. 63-65.

1940

OCTOBER-DECEMBER

3 Oct - 105 United States tanks leave Rock Island, Illinois, to be delivered to Canada.

- Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson announces the formation of an Army parachute corps.

8 Oct - American citizens in the Far East are advised by the Department of State to leave the area.

11 Oct - The attorney general issues an opinion that aliens living in the United States are required to register under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.

12 Oct - President Roosevelt announces a national policy of complete defense of the Western Hemisphere including its oceans, the maintenance of military aid to Britain, and noncompromise with foreign dictators.

- The State Department orders termination of United States diplomatic and consular representation in Czechoslovakia.

16 Oct - All males ages 21 to 35 are required to register for America's first peacetime draft. Total registration is 16,313,240.

21 Oct - The National Defense Act is amended to allow states to organize military units outside the National Guard when the National Guard is on active duty.

22 Oct - President Roosevelt issues an executive order obligating private industry to give top priority to defense orders.

25 Oct - Concern over the fate of French possessions in the Western Hemisphere prompts the United States to request information concerning recent talks between Hitler and Marshal Petain of France. The fear is that if France and Germany join forces against Britain, Germany may take control of French territory in the West Indies.

27 Oct - Italy invades Greece.

29 Oct - Secretary of War Stimson commences America's first peacetime draft by pulling the number 158 from a bowl in the War Department auditorium.

- Five United States destroyers leave Key

West, Florida. Officials refuse to disclose their destination.

30 Oct - President Roosevelt announces the British desire to order 12,000 more American planes and asks the Priorities Board to give the request "most sympathetic consideration."

- The 13,800-ton merchant ship *President Roosevelt* completes her last civilian voyage, arriving in New York to be taken over as an Army transport vessel.

31 Oct - French Ambassador Gaston Henri-Haye assures the Department of State that Petain's talks with Hitler involve no transfer of French territory to Germany.

- Three more destroyers leave Key West on an undisclosed mission.

2 Nov - The Navy announces that eight destroyers and six patrol planes have left Key West to conduct "scheduled exercises" near the French West Indies.

- State draft quotas through 30 June 1941 are announced. New York, Illinois, and Pennsylvania have the three highest quotas, respectively.

4 Nov - United States destroyers patrol the waters off Martinique and Guadeloupe.

5 Nov - President Roosevelt is elected to his third term.

- The War Department announces \$29,993,238 worth of defense contracts.

9 Nov - A United States Maritime Commission ship, the *City of Rayville*, is sunk by a mine in Australian waters.

15 Nov - The United States applies neutrality statutes to the conflict between Italy and Greece.

18 Nov - The first group of draftees is inducted into the Army.

19 Nov - Greece requests military aid from the United States.

20 Nov - Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall announces an agreement whereby the United

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States will give Britain twenty-six B-24 heavy bombers in exchange for enough engines to build forty-one B-17-C "Flying Fortresses."

21 Nov - The Army announces it will have 7,000 new pilots trained by June 1941.

22 Nov - The Japanese press claims that United States Vice Consul Robert W. Rinden and United Press correspondent Melville Jacoby were arrested in French Indo-China on 21 Nov for taking photographs in a Japanese military zone.

23 Nov - A Gallup poll reveals 60 percent of American voters responding in favor of sending more planes to Great Britain even if it means delaying the United States defense program.

25 Nov - In the first large-scale inductions, 1,932 draftees are enrolled across the country for active duty in the Army, the first of 9,343 men to be called up this week.

28 Nov - Greek Minister of National Security Constantine Maniadakis appeals to the United States for military equipment and supplies needed to fight Italy.

2 Dec - President Roosevelt signs a bill expanding the 1918 Anti-Espionage Act to include peacetime as well as wartime sabotage as a federal offense.

3 Dec - Great Britain announces that it has placed orders for 60 new U.S. freighters.

6 Dec - A report by the National Defense Advisory Commission reveals that U.S. shipyards are building new warships for the Navy at the rate of one every twelve days.

- A counselor to the Canadian cabinet's war committee, Leonard Brockington, reports that 10,000 Americans have volunteered for service in the Royal Canadian Air Force since May.

10 Dec - Britain finds President Roosevelt's plan to send food to the German-occupied countries of Europe unacceptable; however it agrees to allow medical supplies through the blockade.

12 Dec - In the first cross-country test of a full American armored division, the 2d Armored Division leaves Fort Benning in 1,102 vehicles and drives ninety miles. Only five of the 400 tanks have mechanical problems.

14 Dec - The Army Reserve is told to prepare for active duty by 15 February.

17 Dec - For the first time President Roosevelt publicly advocates direct arms aid to Britain by lending, leasing, or renting war material.

- The American Eagle Club opens in London for Americans serving in the British and Canadian armed forces.

19 Dec - Army contracts totaling \$12,422,523 are announced.

20 Dec - President Roosevelt creates the Office for Production Management for Defense to more effectively coordinate the production of war munitions.

- Britain orders sixty 10,000-ton freighters from American shipyards.

21 Dec - In response to a news conference in which the British Minister of Shipping suggested that the United States turn over to Britain German and Italian ships moored in American harbors, a spokesman for the German Foreign Office accuses Britain of "inciting America to commit a warlike act."

- For the first time since World War I Regular Army strength exceeds 400,000.

- The fully loaded United States tanker *Charles Pratt*, flying a Panamanian flag, is sunk off the coast of West Africa by a German submarine.

22 Dec - Viscount Halifax is appointed British ambassador to the United States.

29 Dec - In an international radio broadcast President Roosevelt urges labor and Congress, along with the rest of the American people, to support him in his attempts to provide Britain with the war material it needs to defeat Germany and Italy. He announces his intention to ask Congress for Lend-Lease legislation. The president says that if Britain is defeated the Axis' next target will be America.

Lineages and Honors

Clayton R. Newell

The primary reason for keeping track of the lineages and honors of Army units is to instill a sense of pride in soldiers, since without soldiers an Army organization would be literally nothing. No matter how much high technology machinery of war the Army has, it is all useless without motivated soldiers to operate it, soldiers who know they are part of a long and proud tradition of military service. Each lineage and honors certificate represents that tradition in the U.S. Army. The Army considers the lineage and honors certificate given to each eligible organization to be that organization's birth certificate, service record, and deed to organizational properties. The certificate provides an outline of when the unit first came into existence, where it has been, and what honors it has earned.

Whenever it has been necessary to change the size of the Army to adapt its units to new weapons and doctrine, unit organizations have had to change. Since it has been an American tradition to decrease the size of the Army as rapidly as possible at the end of a war and then increase the size for the next war, maintaining clear organizational lines to yesterday's battlefields is not always easy. Given the arcane twists and turns that the Army's force structure has taken during its more than two hundred years of existence, it is truly amazing that unit lineages can be traced at all.

There are three factors that the Army's organizational historians consider in tracing the lineage of an Army unit through its often convoluted history. The first is that an Army unit is a legal entity within the framework of military law. Its purpose is to apply or support organized violence in pursuit of authorized goals. As such, it has the right to possess flags, trophies, and symbols of its honors, and it has the right to bear arms. The second factor is that Army units are social institutions that may have developed unique intangible characteristics such as ceremonies or traditions. A unit may also have its roots in a particular locality or a number or name with special significance. The third factor is that an Army unit is simply a number without meaning. Although tracing lineages sometimes comes down to a subjective evaluation or judgment call based on the three factors given above, individual desires on the part of a historian or unit personnel, past or present, must not be a factor in determining the lineage of any Army unit. For a lineage to have any validity it must be faithful to the historical record, and by and large the

Army has been consistent in tracing the lineages of its units.

There are two methods of tracing a unit lineage. One is simply to follow the number of a unit regardless of any other consideration. Since that number would appear to be the most important and obvious symbol of a unit, this method appears both logical and clear. The problem, however, is that the numerical designation of a unit has not always had the significance it has today. The other method of tracing lineages recognizes that the number of a unit is not always the primary consideration, so this historical method follows a unit's history through its sometimes myriad alterations. While this sometimes produces confusing lineages, it also provides historical realism. The Army, therefore, uses the historical method of tracing unit lineages.

Interest in tracing unit lineages first appeared after the Civil War. At the end of that war the Army, in consonance with the traditional American belief that the United States had no need to maintain a large standing military force in peacetime, reduced its force structure. The regiments left in active service after the completion of the Army's force reduction in 1869 turned to peacetime pursuits. Regimental commanders, having time on their hands and access to a more or less accurate record of what battles their regiment fought in the Civil War, sought to add more honors to their regimental colors by going back to the Mexican War and then to the Revolutionary War to claim credit for battle participation.

Tracing unit lineages earlier than the Mexican War, however, presents difficulties as a result of the 1815 consolidation of regiments. After the War of 1812, the Army drastically reduced its force structure. The forty-six infantry regiments on active duty in 1815 were consolidated into eight regiments, numbered one through eight, based on the date of rank of the commanding officer as prescribed by law and in consonance with contemporary tradition. At the time of the 1815 consolidation, the number of a regiment had no particular meaning, since regiments identified with their commanders or place of organization. The numerical designation of a regiment did not acquire any particular significance until after the Civil War. In consolidating forty-six regiments into eight, however, not one of the eight post-1815 regiments had a number in common with its pre-1815 regiment. As regiments traced their lineages prior to 1815, some identified

with the pre-1815 number and others with the post-1815 number. Consolidating the regiments this way was not a matter of the Army's doing something stupid; it was the appropriate method for the time, and there was simply no way to foresee the day when soldiers would become emotionally involved with a particular regimental number. As long as regiments retained responsibility for determining their lineages, however, they could write it as they pleased. It was not until after World War I that the Army established an office to watch over unit lineages and honors.

In response to the National Defense Act of 1920 the Army designated a specific agency, the Historical Branch of the War Plans Division, to monitor requests for unit honors. That act directed that "the names, numbers and other designations, flags and records of the divisions and subordinate units thereof that served in the World War between April 6, 1917 and November 11, 1918, shall be preserved as such as far as practicable." The Historical Branch published outline histories of all regiments in the 1921 and 1922 editions of the Army Register. However, anyone who thinks the Army is a monolithic institution where its uniformed members always conform to the desires of higher headquarters without question need only examine the history of lineages in the Army's infantry regiments between World War I and II, as generals debated the issue of which regiment would get which honors.

At the end of World War II, the Army faced its greatest force reduction. This massive reduction in force structure was fairly orderly from a lineage point of view, but by then the Army had developed a new wrinkle in its force structure that affected unit lineages. During both World Wars I and II infantry regiments were assigned to divisions, and over a period of time the division became the basic combat organization of the Army. The regiment, however, remained the basic organizational element of the Army for determining lineages. During the force reduction at the end of World War II, regiments were inactivated when the division to which they were assigned was inactivated. As it turned out, some of the older, more highly decorated regiments were inactivated simply because they were assigned to the first divisions to be inactivated. At the same time some newer regiments, such as the airborne infantry, remained on active duty because they had special skills needed in a post-World War II Army. In 1947 the War Department charged the Historical Division (elevated in 1945 from its previous status as a branch) with the functions of initiating and maintaining lineages of units and determining their eligibility for battle honors, a function carried on today by the Center of Military History.

The Korean War had little impact on how the Army traced unit lineages, since there were not the usual drastic, rapid cuts in strength. The size of the Army declined gradually throughout the 1950s. Since the Korean War, however, there have been numerous changes in Army organization. The first post-Korean War change came with the pentomic division, which took its name from the two primary characteristics that determined its design. It was a *pentagonal* structure with five battle groups subordinate to the division headquarters, rather than the traditional triangular structure with three regiments subordinate to the division headquarters. Rather than adding two new regiments to each division, however, the existing regiments were broken into smaller, more flexible battle groups designed to operate on the *atomic* battlefield. Hence it was a pentomic division.

Although the tactical organization of the regiment may have been abandoned, the regimental designations remained; to have done otherwise would simply have ended any relationship to former units. The Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS) was supposed to perpetuate unit history and tradition as well as provide a system that would provide soldiers with recurring assignments to battalions within the same regiment. Unfortunately, the goal of providing a regimental home for soldiers was never reached; the personnel simply could not meet the challenge of keeping close track of every individual in the Army.

One of the goals of CARS was to facilitate future organizational trends, so each of the companies, batteries, or troops in a regiment (as originally organized) became a potential headquarters element in the new CARS regimental reorganization. Each of these new headquarters elements could then be expanded into a battalion when the Army's force structure grew larger. Each headquarters element born of CARS received a replica of the regimental colors with its assigned battalion number in the upper fly.

The pentomic divisions and their battle groups were short lived, and in 1962 they began to be replaced by the Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD). ROAD returned to the triangular structure, but with three combined arms brigades in each division, rather than infantry regiments. Each brigade had a variable number of armor and infantry battalions. Supporting units in the division base included field artillery, air defense artillery, armored cavalry, and a variety of combat service support units. The brigade structure was not to be confined by the rigid infantry regimental organization. Today, however, since the structure of a brigade often remains fixed for long periods of time and sometimes has battalions of a single

combat arm, commanders often mistakenly refer to their brigades as regiments. The present brigade is a truly tactical headquarters, to which more than one type of unit can be attached in varying numbers as the situation requires, a very different concept from the old regiment with its fixed size and structure.

As the Army force structure adapted to CARS and ROAD, it also began to expand as a result of the war in Vietnam. The Vietnam buildup also saw a wide variety of brand new units enter the Army's force structure, units that could have no history simply because no organization remotely like it had ever existed before. While it is possible to provide a reasonable lineal connection between a nineteenth-century cavalry regiment and a twentieth-century helicopter gunship battalion because they both can conduct screening missions, for instance, it is simply not plausible to re-create that same sort of ancestry for an aircraft maintenance unit.

After the Vietnam War the Army reduced its force structure from twenty-four divisions to thirteen, but like the post-Korean War reduction, it was a relatively orderly transition. Also like the period after the Korean War, it was not a change in the size of the Army that next affected tracing lineages, but a reorganization. After Korea, however, the Army reorganized for doctrinal reasons and adapted the traditional regimental system to the new organization; after Vietnam the Army reorganized the regimental system itself.

The chief of the staff of the Army approved the United States Army Regimental System (USARS) in 1981. As in the Army's earlier regimental scheme, CARS, the idea behind USARS was to provide the opportunity for soldiers to identify with a single regiment throughout an Army career. USARS, however, has fared no better than CARS in implementing the idea of moving individuals from battalion to battalion within the same regiment. The personnel system of the 1980s could not handle the problem any better than the 1950s system. Unfortunately, without the personnel

system supporting USARS, the Army has rearranged many of the traditional relationships between regiments and divisions for no apparent reason.

In spite of the twists, roadblocks, and downed bridges found along the trail of a unit's lineage, the Army has tried mightily over the years to provide an accurate record of who, what, and where its units are and were. The inevitable changes imposed on the system have generally been with the best of intentions. That changes periodically cause as much trouble as help is probably simply a reflection of the American view of history and its Army. Generally speaking, Americans look to the future with little concern for what has happened before. History, therefore, is not always a great concern in considering the day-to-day problems of life. Likewise, Americans generally have an optimistic view of the world and prefer to see peace as the normal state of affairs; their Army is not a daily concern, although they do expect that it will be ready when it is needed. The Army also looks forward, and yet it does understand that somehow a unit's history may be important to its performance in combat. To prepare for the future without spending too much time mucking about in the past, the Army has devised a system of tracing lineages that it can issue along with everything else a unit needs to go to war.

Given the twists and turns of past policy, the Army's present system of lineages and honors is probably about as good as it is going to get. No matter how convoluted the path has been from the past to the present, our soldiers can be confident that what they see on their unit birth certificates accurately reflects the heritage of their unit. They can be proud both of their achievements and the achievements of their predecessors as they strive to be all they can be.

Lt. Col. Clayton R. Newell is chief of the Center's Historical Services Division, which is responsible for maintaining the Army's lineages and honors.

A Battalion Commander's View Using Military History to Develop Army Unit Leaders

Jerry D. Morelock

The purpose of this article is twofold: to share with you the experiences of a recent unit commander using military history to develop leadership in Army units and to express the author's personal (and not necessarily the Department of the Army's) views on the Army

climate regarding military history at the grassroots level. In keeping with the rapidly developing tradition of putting the bottom line up front, the bottom line for this article reads "Military history is an important and outstanding means of furthering professional develop-

ment, but its integration into the unit training program must be carefully planned and executed." Overall, that means the news is good—or at least it can be good.

One Battalion's Program

The program we adopted in our battalion to integrate all facets of military history into the unit's professional development activities is presented here only as one example of what can be done. It is certainly not intended to be a blueprint for every battalion-size unit, nor is it meant to imply that these activities are unique only to our group. Many organizations throughout the Army are conducting useful and imaginative training centered on history as routine components of their unit training programs. Our particular program is presented, therefore, only to show what we actually did—and how it worked for us.

Long before assuming battalion command I determined to use the unique power of military history to enhance and supplement training whenever possible. Before taking command the commander should have a good idea of what activities to pursue as well as how to go about implementing those activities. If some thought and planning are given to this before the initial transition meeting with the battalion staff and subordinate commanders, then the new battalion commander can begin the integrating process immediately, emphasizing to all that the training activities involving military history are, in fact, real training events—as important as all the others in the training plan. In addition to ensuring that all staff and commanders understood the importance placed on this historical emphasis, each was given a "starter kit" of selected history and leadership books I had purchased (these included Michael Shaara's *Killer Angels* and Roger Nye's excellent study guide, *The Challenge of Command*.)

The primary training events we used to integrate the study of military history into unit training included: Officer Professional Development (OPD) seminars, book reports, staff rides, war on film, unit history projects, and a long-term project to name our headquarters kaserne after a World War II historical figure with ties to our unit and area.

The heart of any unit training program in professional development is the OPD seminar. All Army units are required to have an OPD program, mandated and approved by the next higher commander. Many of these, however, are designed simply to teach officers some of the technical skills required by their duty position or to update them on new trends evolving in their branch or functional area. While technical proficiency is certainly one of the foundations for success,

these skills can and should be acquired by other means. We felt it was more important to use those OPD seminars to focus on ethics, professionalism, and intellectual development, i.e., those things that last and are important throughout a lifetime of service. That is where military history comes in, for nothing else available to unit-training leaders can teach, inspire, motivate, and instruct with the same power or relevance.

Our OPD seminars occurred every four to six weeks and generally followed the same format. The battalion commander introduced each seminar and either presented the subject or handed over to the officer making the presentation. After a presentation typically lasting about two hours, a thirty-minute discussion of the issues was directed by another selected officer. Most of these OPD seminars used military history as an integral part of the training. Examples of topics covered included the history of the profession of arms, an examination of battle conditions (a la John Keegan's *Face of Battle*), historical development of the Soviet Army, and several seminars on the Battle of the Bulge and Waterloo, supporting our staff rides to those battle sites. Officers assigned oral book reports were encouraged to be imaginative and creative. As an example, the officer who reported on Cornelius Ryan's *A Bridge Too Far* took his video camera to nearby Arnhem and taped his report at historical locations, thereby significantly enhancing his presentation.

I presented the initial seminar, "The Profession of Arms," since I wanted to set standards for methods of instruction, media availability, and structure for future seminars, as well as to establish standards for conduct and professionalism within the battalion. Additionally, I presented the initial oral book report for the same reasons, using *Killer Angels* for the first example. It is a popular book within the Army, since it is easy to read, exciting, and can help ease non-history readers into an area they previously considered dry and uninteresting.

Book reports were an integral part of the program to use military history to further professional development. All officers in the battalion were required to read and report on a book from an approved list each quarter. This exercise not only got them to actually read a book, it caused them to write and, in the process, to think about their profession. Books were selected from the Command and General Staff Officer Course reading list or approved by the battalion commander. Each quarter, the chain of command graded the reports for format and content and provided specific feedback to each officer. This input was crucial, since it enabled all participants to improve their writing skills as well as to develop their critical thinking process. We picked selected reports to submit to professional journals, and

three were published during the time I was with the battalion. As an added benefit, the book reports enabled me as the rater or senior rater to have several examples of each officer's work when preparing officer evaluation reports.

The centerpiece of our efforts to include military history in our training program was the staff ride. We conducted two staff rides during my two-year command tour; one was the 1944 Ardennes offensive (the Battle of the Bulge), and the second was the 1815 battle at Waterloo. Although the Waterloo staff ride had to be modified for time and resources because of its position in the overall unit training plan, both staff rides featured all aspects and phases of a true and proper staff ride and were conducted according to Dr. Glenn Robertson's staff ride manual. To further highlight these activities as true training events, they were planned, coordinated, and conducted exactly as any other routine training activity and military operation. Each staff section was responsible for its part of the total action, and all elements were involved. As stated earlier, OPD seminars were used to complete the preliminary study phase, and all officers participated. By placing these events on the unit's long-range training plan well ahead of time, we were able to conduct the field study phases on the battlefields during historically appropriate times, i.e., the Ardennes in December and Waterloo in June. Back from the battlefields, we used the seven battlefield operating systems (command and control, maneuver, logistics, etc.) to tie all together during the integration phase. The result was solid, mission-related training that allowed the participants to sharpen their communication and research skills, as well as to prepare themselves better to lead their soldiers in combat. (For a more detailed look at the staff ride exercise, see my article, "Using the Staff Ride for Battalion Training," *Army History*, Fall 1989, pp. 8-10.)

Our war-on-film program turned out to be fun, while capitalizing on the visual orientation of today's youth and the dramatic possibilities of so-called war films. We maintained it as the only strictly voluntary activity of all the history-related training programs, although most officers attended the monthly screenings. The films were selected for their ability to illustrate history and how it relates to the profession, ethics in a military situation, professionalism in all its aspects, as well as leadership and training. The Combat Studies Institute's publication *War on Film* is an excellent guide to the many films currently available, and most entries include a brief plot summary and cast listing. Screenings were conducted after normal duty hours in a relaxed atmosphere such as the

officers' mess or NATO club. The screening of the film was followed by a discussion led each time by a different volunteer officer. Following the discussion, family members were invited to join us for an informal dinner. Some of the films we used included *Breaker Morant*, *Paths of Glory*, *Pork Chop Hill*, and *Waterloo*. Before leaving this subject, I think it is important to emphasize here that merely sitting around watching a movie does not constitute professional development training. Thought and prior planning must be conducted to ensure that appropriate teaching points and training objectives are brought out during the discussion phase. Indeed, the discussion is clearly the most important part of this activity, and the main training emphasis should be here.

History should be used as much as possible to develop unit esprit de corps and build soldier morale. The historical perspective of a unit's heritage can provide a focus for pride among all the soldiers. This can be especially difficult to achieve in a unit such as ours, composed of many subordinate units located in widely scattered sites and manned by soldiers of several different branches. We attempted to involve all members of the battalion in activities relating to unit history and lineage whenever possible. One way, popular in many units, is to create a unit heritage room to serve as a focal point for displays and activities relating to the lineage, heritage, and mission of the unit. In addition to serving as a repository for unit memorabilia, it should contain everything that can help current soldiers identify with former members of the unit and their exploits from an earlier day. This heritage room should be open to all soldiers of the battalion, however, and not become the exclusive club of the officer and senior noncommissioned officer leadership.

Other activities that we undertook relating to unit history and lineage included a formal presentation of our battalion's World War II battle streamer to the massed soldiers of the unit, and a celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the beginning of the battalion's service with the British I Corps, complete with British, German, and American dignitaries. These activities can be as complicated and showy as the international event just described, or as simple as selecting the least historically significant subordinate unit for inactivation when given the choice. What matters, I believe, is to maintain a historical perspective in all activities, including the routine day-to-day ones.

The highlight of the unit-related historical events was the formal naming of our headquarters kaserne, a project that took nearly two years to accomplish. Although our unit had been headquartered in the same German town for twenty-five years, our kaserne had

never been formally named and was referred to only by the name of the closest village. A little historical research revealed that the unit, as well as the area of Germany in which it was stationed, had strong ties to the World War II U.S. Ninth Army and its commander, General William H. Simpson. It seemed a natural choice, therefore, to request that our kaserne be formally named after this outstanding commander. A coordinated staff effort was undertaken that eventually involved U.S., British, German, and NATO offices at the local, regional, and even national level—including at one point the U.S. Army Center of Military History. After diligent work, Headquarters, Department of the Army, finally approved the naming; and at a formal ceremony in June 1989 we officially opened the General William Hood Simpson Barracks in Muenster, Federal Republic of Germany.

The foregoing activities are only examples of some of the things units can do to enhance training/leader development activities with military history. Our program is certainly not all-inclusive, nor is it meant to be a prescription for all battalion-size units. It is, however, what one unit did in an important area of training. None of the activities would have been as effective, however, without a climate within the Army that fosters and supports the kind of training outlined above. The second half of this article addresses my view of how that climate appears today.

The Army's Climate for Military History

There are and always will be plenty of excuses available to rationalize not expending the effort on any given project. This is as true for history-related activities as for any other training event. The enduring truth is that anything worth doing requires some effort and necessitates some cost to do it well. We have all heard the typical excuses used to justify not integrating history-related training events—they go like this:

"Too busy with the real mission..."

"Not enough time to do it right..."

"Don't see the relevance for our unit..."

"Most people aren't interested in history..."

"Need an expert historian (not available) to do it right..."

"My boss doesn't care about that emphasis, so neither do I..."

These excuses simply mean that those using them think the effort is too great. I do not believe that any of these excuses are really valid—they are merely justifications for not doing something new. Those who persist in using these lame excuses probably do not conduct much challenging or innovative training in any area, not

just military history. It is a shame that we still hear these excuses, because I believe the Army's attitude toward history-related training is generally positive.

The Army's leadership from the very highest level currently is quite supportive of any training activity that integrates military history into the unit training plan. The former secretary of the Army and the current chief of staff have both set examples in this regard, sponsoring such activities as staff rides for members of the Army staff. The chief of staff extols the virtues of reading military history in each of his annual training tapes when he refers to *America's First Battles* and the "threads of continuity" to be gleaned by studying military history. The Army "schoolhouse" at each level is fully on board, emphasizing the value of history in all regular courses, officer and enlisted. Additionally, each battalion and brigade commander attending the precommand course at Fort Leavenworth receives a talk by the director of the Combat Studies Institute on the importance of history. Examples of this positive emphasis are numerous and can be found throughout the Army.

Although most Army leaders are supportive of the use of history for training, there are exceptions—"dinosaurs" still exist. I once had a colonel, my immediate superior at the time, tell me: "Quit worrying about Geronimo and Patton and start doing your job." I was not particularly worried by the dated attitude the author of this quote expressed, since our brigade commander was fully convinced of the value of innovative and well-planned training, including that involving history-related activities. My "dinosaur" colonel was selected for early retirement, but the point I want to make here is this: It is important to ensure that your higher level leaders are fully informed of the benefits to be derived from history-related activities. They have to understand that this kind of training is especially suited to producing better readers, better writers, better thinkers, and therefore better soldiers.

Soldiers themselves have a much more positive view of military history than those who generate the above excuses would have us believe. I have found that most soldiers generally like military history, although sometimes they do not realize that they like it. Instead, they may associate history with the reading of dry, boring books, forgetting for the moment that an interest in things military is one reason why they chose a military career in the first place. Most soldiers do understand the relevance of history and can associate it with their professional development. They can recognize the link with their current unit mission, and they usually want to read about their unit lineage and understand their unit history. However, the "down" side

(virtually across the board) is that most of today's soldiers hate to read—and will avoid it whenever possible. They hate to write even more than they hate to read, and many write poorly. Collectively, this group is not used to thinking about their profession and the art of war—a fact that is often mistaken as an antihistory attitude. In reality, the challenge with history-related training is not really any different from the challenge with any kind of training, i.e., how to structure it in a way that is interesting, useful, innovative, and effective. The excuse makers do not try to accomplish this, and therefore they are selling their soldiers short.

After two years of battalion command, I believe there are some key elements to integrating history-related training into the unit training plan. The first and foremost of these is the need to relate any training, historical or otherwise, to the unit mission. Current Army doctrine tells leaders that all training events must support the unit mission. If you cannot relate it to your mission in some way, then it does not belong in your training schedule. For example, a *Face of Battle* OPD seminar examining the brutal realities of a combat environment is clearly related to several Mission Essential Task List (METL) tasks found in most units.

There is another sense in which mission applies to history-related training. Treat history programs as you would treat any unit mission or requirement. Handle them as any coordinated staff action is handled in the unit. Rather than task one project officer with everything, involve each of the responsible staff sections. Incorporate update briefings into normal staff calls and insist your staff coordinate the training as they would any training event. For a staff ride, have operations (S-3) write the plan, supply (S-4) coordinate logistic and transportation support, intelligence (S-2) secure the necessary maps, and administration (S-1) handle personnel issues (you may want to have the chaplain ask for good weather).

To successfully integrate history-related events into the unit training program, you have to put them on the training schedule. Incorporate them into the long-range, short-range, and near-term training plans and do not handle them "off line" as special projects. If these activities end up in a special projects category, I guarantee that they will be the first things to be dropped off your schedule when the inevitable "crunch" comes. Likewise, apply normal training principles to history-related training when you are planning that training. Develop tasks, conditions, and standards for using history and know your objectives. Indeed, if you have properly related the training to your METL and unit mission, you should already have accomplished this.

The key to integrating history, as in any training, is planning.

A major problem will continue to be resources: the time, money, people, and material necessary to conduct any training event properly. These are, and will remain, extremely limited. This is especially true of the most fleeting resource, time. There is never enough time to do everything you want to do. There never will be enough time even if you cut *all* history-related activities. The key is to organize, set priorities, and maximize the available resources to create the best training environment you can. Let history-related training compete with your other training events for these resources. If you have established it as part of your annual training plan, then allowing it to compete should automatically follow. Moreover, I submit that you can use history as a resource itself, to help conserve other precious resources. History is unique in training in that it allows the unit to substitute the vicarious experiences of others for costly training events. In some forms it could be used as a substitute for expensive field training exercises, or as part of a work-up for the exercise to maximize the training value. All that is required is a little imagination.

The final word I want to share on this subject concerns responsibility. It is a tired and overused, but nevertheless appropriate, military truism that the commander is responsible for everything done by the unit. This includes training—including history-related training. As part of the commander's duty to provide for the professional development of all subordinates in the unit, I believe that the commander has a responsibility to strive to incorporate training that includes history whenever possible. Commanders have the responsibility to take innovative risks in providing the very best and most comprehensive training they can. This means, I think, meeting the excuses head-on to counter the anti-intellectual, antihistory attitudes found in some units today. Nothing happens without command interest. The point to be made, then, is that I think commanders should be interested in using history to make their soldiers the very best soldiers they are capable of being. They owe it to them to try. Years ago, when assigned to the Pentagon, I had a boss who gave us only one of two types of guidance when we received an action—he would say either "make this go away" or "make this happen." I hope we choose the latter.

Lt. Col. Jerry D. Morelock is the former commander of the 570th Artillery Group. A "5X" Historian, he is now a student at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Focus on the Field

**History Office, Deputy Chief of Staff,
Operations**

**U.S. Army Intelligence and
Security Command**

James L. Gilbert, Command Historian


The History Office, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), has something of a history of its own. The office can trace its origins back to 1946, when the famed American cryptologist William O. Friedman, then Director of Communications Research, Army Security Agency (ASA), sponsored an attempt to document the World War II history of ASA's predecessor, the Signal Security Agency, the Army's secret organization for both making and breaking codes. This agency's accomplishments had been credited with shortening the war in the Pacific by as much as two years.

In response to Friedman's initiative, ASA created a large history office, which proceeded to write a multivolume World War II history. This was given a very high security classification and then locked in a safe, where it remains to the present day. (As part of the government's declassification program, some sanitized volumes are now being released by the National Security Agency.) Once in place, however, the ASA History Office continued to document ASA's organizational and operational activities by preparing annual historical reports based on similar reports from every

subordinate unit in ASA's vertical (or "stovepipe") command structure. For much of its existence, the ASA History Office was manned by a mix of civilian and military personnel, but it became completely civilian once the end of the draft terminated the supply of qualified enlisted historians.

In 1977 as part of a general reorganization of Army intelligence, ASA was redesignated as the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and given the new mission of managing the Army's multidiscipline intelligence-collection assets at the echelon-above-corps level. In turn, this new assignment affected the way in which the history office went about its business. The history office was now in a position to gather data not just on one compartment of military intelligence, but on the whole spectrum of Army intelligence efforts.

For the past thirteen years the INSCOM History Office has been authorized a three-person staff consisting of the command historian, an additional historian, and a writer-editor. Organizationally, the office is a subordinate element of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations. The office is not only small, but it also possesses a number of unique characteristics that set it apart somewhat from other historical offices in the Army. One difference is the nature of the command that it serves. Unlike other Army major commands (MACOMs), whose peacetime functions are limited to readiness, training, or material acquisition, INSCOM conducts a worldwide live mission twenty-four hours a



*Direction-finding "tractor"
during World War I*



Trying to control a World War I observation balloon

day, seven days a week. Second, because of the nature of the mission, many of our products remain classified, as are the sources themselves. Because of security considerations, INSCOM is the only Army organization officially allowed to maintain its own archival holdings. Finally, the INSCOM History Office tends to have closer ties with other historical elements throughout the intelligence community than with history offices in other Army MACOMs.

Despite its relatively small size, the INSCOM History Office has been able to engage in a wide range of activities. In addition to preparing the Command Annual Historical Review, the office also exercises staff supervision over the historical effort conducted by some seventy staff elements and subordinate units. Each year it answers several hundred requests for information coming from both internal and external sources. The office maintains selected documents and approximately 10,000 photographs to support the artifacts contained within the INSCOM historical holding and uses these raw materials to mount periodic exhibits inside and outside the headquarters building. It oversees a small art collection of paintings and sketches executed by ASA combat artists during the Vietnam War. The history office also conducts periodic classes in professional development and makes arrangements

for an annual staff ride to one of the numerous nearby Civil War battlefields.

Beginning in 1982, when the INSCOM History Office was finally able to attain its full manning level of three people, the office not only expanded its existing classified history program but also began an effort to meet the larger needs of the Army and the public at large. So far, the office has published the photo history *Military Intelligence: A Picture History*, and a collection of articles on military intelligence personalities entitled *Military Intelligence: Its Heroes and Legends*. Additionally, the office has produced the poster series *History of Military Intelligence*, issued unclassified documents on INSCOM and its heritage, and prepared an audiovisual history of Arlington Hall Station (site of ASA and INSCOM headquarters until 1989).

In the near future in collaboration with the Center of Military History, the history office hopes to publish a military intelligence volume in the Army Lineage Series. Finally, to help with the Army's commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of World War II, the INSCOM History Office plans to publish a document collection on Army signals intelligence in that conflict, again in collaboration with the Center of Military History.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Final Memoranda: Major General Ralph H. Van Deman, USA Ret., 1865-1952: Father of U.S. Military Intelligence

edited by Ralph E. Weber

Scholarly Resources. 191 pp., \$30.00

Listening to the Enemy: Key Documents on the Role of Communications Intelligence in the War Against Japan

edited by Ronald H. Spector

Scholarly Resources. 285 pp., \$50.00

Two excellent compilations of documents relating to military intelligence have recently appeared under the Scholarly Resources imprint. Marquette professor Ralph E. Weber has located and assembled a series of memoranda written by Maj. Gen. Ralph Van Deman, who served as the first chief of the War Department's military intelligence organization in World War I. The first part of Weber's book contains Van Deman's reminiscences on the evolution of intelligence work in the United States Army, on his early career, and his later service as an intelligence officer in World War I. These documents, written in 1949 and 1950 during Van Deman's retirement, furnish the scholar with some unique insights.

Van Deman's comments on the complete debilitation of the Army's intelligence organization at the time we entered World War I are particularly interesting. He points out that the intelligence function within the Army had actually declined soon after the establishment of the General Staff in 1903. Originally, the General Staff had consisted of three divisions. The Second Division was the Military Information Division, which was charged with carrying out what we would now describe as intelligence functions. However, a struggle over office space had resulted in the division's being melded into the Army War College Division. Shorn of its independent institutional base, the intelligence function withered. As Van Deman remembered, "from the time of the consolidation no military intelligence work was accomplished either in the United States or abroad except the reports of the military attaches continued to be received and filed..."

In the introduction Van Deman provided to his recollections, he admitted that they might contain some factual slips, since he was writing many years after the fact, and "the writer has had to depend entirely on his unaided memory, without notes of any kind." It was therefore useful that Professor Weber chose to include in his volume two additional memoranda that Van

Deman had submitted to his superiors in March 1916, while serving as an officer on the General Staff. These documents buttress Van Deman's recollections on the sorry state of U.S. Army intelligence on the eve of our entry into the First World War. In 1916 Van Deman had to inform the chief of the War College Division of the General Staff that "from the point of view of military information, we are not prepared for military operations even in our own country, and we are doing nothing to remedy the condition." It was not until after the United States actually entered the war that Van Deman was allowed to build up a functional intelligence organization. His success in doing so laid the basis for the present Military Intelligence Branch and justifies his appellation "Father of Military Intelligence."

Listening to the Enemy, a collection of Army and Navy documents dealing with signals intelligence in World War II, was put together by Dr. Ronald Spector, a distinguished military historian who has previously authored a volume in the Army official history of the Vietnam War for the Center of Military History. In his present book, Spector draws upon his research for *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War Against Japan* to provide us with an excellent sampling of the types of World War II cryptologic documents released as Special Research Histories by the National Security Agency and presented to the National Archives, where they form Record Group 457. The documents that Spector includes in this collection primarily come from Navy sources, but Spector also draws upon a rich lode of Army-related material, including the war reminiscences of an Army communications intelligence officer caught up in the battle for Bataan, and several interesting pieces dealing with the organization and relationships of the Special Branch of the Military Intelligence Service (the communications intelligence arm of Army G-2 in World War II) and with the Special Security Officer system set up by Special Branch to serve as a conduit of communications intelligence to the field.

The whole subject of intelligence has been for too long shrouded in mystery. The difficulty of gaining access to reliable sources has allowed popularizers and fabulists a free reign. The publication of these two useful document collections marks the beginning of an overdue effort to give the history of military intelligence its rightful place in the story of the Army as a whole.

Dr. John P. Finnegan is a historian with the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

A Long March: The Lives of Frank and Allie Baldwin

by Robert H. Steinbach

University of Texas Press. 223 pp., \$24.95.

It is perhaps understandable that the military profession occasionally produces soldiers whose milieu is war--individuals who thrive on field service and find themselves at loose ends when peace sets in. Modern observers might readily identify George Patton as the archetype; students of America's frontier period could well settle upon Frank Baldwin as one who fits the warrior mold.

Frank Dwight Baldwin wanted so much to be a soldier that he survived three rejections of his proffered teenage service before being accepted at age twenty for volunteer Civil War duty. He reaffirmed his dedication by remaining steadfast to his martial dream even after being twice captured but expeditiously released by Confederate forces to fight again another day. He was recommended for the Medal of Honor for action at Stones River, Tennessee, and was awarded that high decoration for distinguished bravery at Peachtree Creek in Georgia.

Accepted into federal service in 1866, Baldwin went on to garner a second Medal of Honor for distinguished gallantry in action against Indians on McClellan Creek in Texas in 1874, an action enhanced by his rescue from captivity of the Germain sisters. The second award placed him in exclusive company; Frank Baldwin and George Custer's brother Tom are the only Regular officers ever to have been twice honored with the Medal of Honor.

Robert Steinbach's book makes several important contributions to military literature. While he has sketched out the "bookends" of Baldwin's career--Civil War service in the opening phase and Philippines duty at the close--it is the substantive connective service, portraying the harsh realities of frontier military life on a soldier and his lady, that is especially significant.

Baldwin married Alice Blackwood, like Frank a native of Michigan, in 1867, and their first posting was to Fort Ellsworth in Kansas. The couple embarked there upon a married life marked by frequent transfers, primitive living conditions, low pay, forced separation, bore-

dom, danger, and the ever-present threat of disability or death. Not surprisingly, Baldwin filled in the gaps by drinking and gambling, Allie by fits of depression. A daughter, Juanita, helped smooth the way to some extent.

Steinbach makes effective use of family papers to fix some fundamental differences between his principal characters and trace the strains that grew out of them: Frank's ideal of the "Victorian" wife whose submerged and selfless role should be essentially that of support for her husband; Allie's inclination to be her own person and indulge her talents as singer, pianist, painter, writer, as the mood struck her. Whatever success attended either mate, Allie won out in the end, surviving Frank by seven years and publishing the *Memoirs of the Late Frank D. Baldwin* (Los Angeles: Wetzel Publishing Co., 1929), written largely by herself but with the help of several of her husband's colleagues and author E. A. Brininstool.

Whether eschewed by originators, censored by relatives, avoided by biographers, or sanitized by editors, intimacies in written communications between man and wife are often missing from biographical accounts. Not so this book. The author includes several allusions, principally by Allie, that give perspective, essence, humor, and a certain poignancy to the story of two human beings suffering forced separations.

Frank Baldwin's frontier service was impressive in peace and war. He served in Kansas, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, Montana, and the Dakotas, and brought firmness and fairness to his dealings with the Indian in the variety of combat and peace-keeping missions that came his way. He was highly respected by his peers for his conduct in both fields and was regularly called upon by his mentor, Nelson Miles, to undertake special assignments. If Frank and Allie were often discouraged over long years of stagnation and delay in advancement, they yet hung in there, and it was a major general that Allie laid to rest in Arlington Cemetery on a spring day in 1923. Theirs had, indeed, been a "long march," and Robert Steinbach has told their story well.

William Gardner Bell is a historian of the American West. An expert on the frontier Army, Mr. Bell formerly served with the Center's Staff Support Branch.

Professional Events

1989 Military History Writing Contest Winners

Brig. Gen. Harold W. Nelson, U.S. Army Chief of Military History, has announced the winners of the Army's 1989 Military History Writing Contest.

Capt. Stephen C. Danckert, Ordnance Officers Advanced Course, won first prize and a cash award of \$500 in the annual competition. Captain Danckert's winning essay was entitled "A Genius for Training: Baron von Steuben and the Training of the Continental Army." Currently Captain Danckert is assigned to the 611th Ordnance Company, U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army. The article will be published in the Winter 1990/1991 issue of *Army History*.

Second place and \$400 went to Capt. Robert P. Feliu, Infantry Officers Advanced Course, for "The Battle of Landing Zone X-Ray: An American Victory in Vietnam." Captain Feliu is assigned to the 29th Infantry Regiment, General J. Lawton Collins Training Center, Fort Benning, Georgia.

Capt. Anthony N. Cook, also a student in the Ordnance Officers Advanced Course during 1989, won third place and \$300 for an essay entitled "The Afro-American Experience During the Civil War." Currently, he is the commander of the 523d Maintenance Company (TMDE), U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army.

The final award was to Capt. Douglas S. Dankworth, Armor Officers Advanced Course, who garnered fourth place and \$200 for his Vietnam essay entitled "Winning the Hearts and Minds; Winning the Vietnam War." He is now assigned to the 2d Battalion, 13th Armor, at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

1990 Military History Writing Contest Rules

The 1990 contest will be limited to three prizes and held according to the following rules:

-Eligibility: Participation is limited to students attending officer advanced courses and the Sergeants Major Academy during calendar year 1990.

-Entries: Submit two copies of previously unpublished manuscripts, 2,000-3,000 words (7-10 pages), typed, double-spaced. Documentation is required, but footnotes and endnotes are not to be included in calculating the length. Submit graphics, illustrations, or photographs as if the article were to be published. Include Sergeants Major Academy or advanced course title, course number, and forwarding address.

-Topics: Essays should develop a limited historical theme related to the Army. Some suggested topic areas include:

-Analysis of World War II or Korean War battles and campaigns. (Note that this is the period of the 40th anniversary of the Korean War and the 50th anniversary of World War II.)

-The black experience during World War II, Korea, the Civil War, or Spanish-American War.

-Historical perspective on a leader, leaders, or leadership, training, logistics, desert operations, or chemical warfare.

-Fighting outnumbered and winning, e.g., the Ardennes or Korea.

-Deadline: Entries must be postmarked by midnight 31 December 1990 to the U.S. Army Center of Military History, ATTN: DAMH-FI (Writing Contest), Bldg. 159, SEFC/WNY, Washington, D.C. 20374-5088.

-Prizes: First place, \$500 and publication in *Army History*; second, \$300; third, \$100, or as the judges direct.

-Judging: Papers will be judged by a panel of military historians using the following criteria: usefulness to today's Army leaders, originality, historical accuracy, sources/documentation, style, and rhetoric. Contest winners will be announced by the end of April 1991. Point of contact at the Center of Military History is Mr. Billy Arthur, AV 335-2905, or commercial (202) 475-2905.

Military History Research in Progress

Louis Keefer, author of *Scholars in Foxholes: The Story of the Army Specialized Training Program in World War II*, is now conducting research on Italian prisoners of war in the United States, 1943-1946. He submits the following information and thesis: "Italian prisoners of war held in the United States during World War II never received the appreciation of the U.S. Army and the American public that I feel they so fully earned by their enthusiastic contributions toward the Allied war effort.

"From mid-1943 through mid-1945 the U.S. Army held some 50,000 Italian soldiers, sailors, and airmen captured in North Africa and Sicily. Many remained until early 1946. After Italy's surrender in September 1943 and its declaration of war against Germany the following month, two-thirds of the POWs were eventually organized as 'Italian Service Units (ISU).' Some

195 company-sized units...more than 35,000 men, were stationed throughout the country.

"Although still technically POWs, these men wore modified U.S. Army uniforms, worked with minimal supervision, could sight-see in nearby cities in groups (with G.I. 'escorts') and could even attend dances and other social events outside their camps. Most of them were happy to be out of the war, safe and well fed.

"Unfortunately for them, the U.S. Army was unable to convince some Americans how these former enemies could suddenly become friends. Not understanding that the Italians had *volunteered* to help us by serving wherever the Army sent them (short of combat duties), and that they were non-Fascists loyal to the Allied cause, critics of the ISU program charged the Army with 'coddling' its prisoners.

"Little of this story has been told. So far, the *History of Prisoner of War Utilization by the United States Army 1776-1945* by Lt. Col. George G. Lewis and Capt. John Mewha (Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-213, June 1955) remains the best basic source for prisoner statistics and labor programs. Several good books have been written about the German POWs held here, but to my knowledge, none about the Italians."

Anyone wishing to share anecdotal material about contact with the Italian POWs or otherwise interested in assisting with this research should contact Mr. Louis Keefer at 1503 Farsta Court, Reston, Virginia 22090. Tel. (703) 742-8260.

In the Next Issue of *Army History*...

The 1989 Military History Writing Contest prize-winning essay on Baron von Steuben and the training of the Continental Army, by Capt. Stephen C. Danckert.

Maj. Charles E. Kirkpatrick's analysis of Lesley J. McNair's training philosophy for the Army.

Herbert P. Lepore's study of the role of the "Eyes in the Sky"--liaison aircraft in World War II.

Maj. Donald A. Carter's reflections on teaching military history at West Point and the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Book reviews of Thomas St. John Arnold's *Buffalo Soldiers: The 92d Infantry Division and Reinforcements in World War II, 1942-1945*, and Edward K. Eckert's *In War and Peace: An American Military History Anthology*.

And much more . . .

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